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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Determinism is the thesis that the state of the world at any time uniquely determines the 
state of the world at all future times. Our best scientific theories seem inconclusive as to whether 
our world is deterministic. Our world could very well be either partially or completely 
deterministic. But determinism is not as innocuous as it seems; the truth of determinism seems to 
come into conflict with many intuitive concepts. One such concept is objective chance. Our 
intuitive notions of objective chances are tied to the belief that events could have turned out 
differently than the way they actually occurred. Though many philosophers have declared that 
this conception of objective chance is incompatible with deterministic worlds, some have tried to 
provide accounts that render the two compatible. In this thesis I investigate what a theory of 
deterministic chance could be. Working within certain metaphysical constraints on chance, I 
craft out a new dispositional account of chance grounded in properties that objects have.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 What are we to make of seemingly conflicting concepts? Well, there are two possible 
courses of action: 1) argue that one of the concepts must be empty if the other concept is true or 
2) argue that the seeming conflict does not exist. Philosophers who taken the first course of 
action are called incompatibilist of whatever concepts they are investigating, while philosophers 
attempting to show that two concepts to do not necessarily conflict are known as compatibilists. 
The most famous debate about compatibilism is the battle between hard determinist, libertarians, 
and compatibilists over free will. In fact the word ‘compatibilism’ is mostly used to the position 
that the defenders of both determinism and free will. This thesis will address another type of 
compatibilism. The debate at the center of this thesis does not center directly on any notions of 
human agency but it does deal with determinism. The compatibilism at the heart of my thesis is 
the compatibilism between determinism and chance.  
 Chances seem to creep into our lives at every junction. This is a chance your favorite 
football team with get the ball to start the game, your health insurance rate is in part a function of 
the chance of you getting ill, in Main there is often a chance of snow, and you might be given a 
certain chance of surviving cancer. We know that chances are related to probability and we even 
have the mathematical tools to calculate the chance of an event occurring but rarely do we think 
seriously about what chance really is. Like most concepts, the metaphysical depth of chance 
escapes our daily thought.  
 This thesis will investigate what it means to be a chance and whether we could have 
chances in a deterministic world. My project will be a compatibilistic project that builds on 
existing metaphysical foundations. My intention is not to settle all of the issues that I use to build 
my account. It is impossible within the confines of this thesis to fully address the nuances of all 
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of the issues involved. What I do hope to do is provide a strong enough account of determinism 
and chance that can weather many different views on the smaller metaphysical foundations used 
to build the argument.  
 The thesis is constructed on chapters that build on each other. The function of the first 
chapter is to work through the development of determinism to arrive at the working definition 
that is used in the remaining chapters of the thesis. The first chapter also functions to show the 
necessity of taking determinism seriously. In the second chapter I introduce the problem of 
deterministic chances in all of its glory. Chapters three and four are the chapters that lay the 
foundation for my positive account in chapter five. Chapter 3 introduces Antony Eagle’s Can-
Ability Principle (CAP)- a principle that I endorse because of its ability to show what would 
have to be true of an account of chance for it to posit deterministic chances. As I note in chapter 
three, CAP does not provide a full account of chance and so I turn, in chapter four, to evaluating 
Mellor’s dispositional theory of chance. Finding Mellor’s account promising yet flawed and 
incomplete, I seek to provide my own dispositional account of chance in the fifth and final 
chapter.  
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 CHAPTER I 
 
CLIMBING UP THE TOWER 
 
 
 
Determinism is the perennial topic of philosophical discussion. Very little 
acquaintance with philosophical literature is needed to reveal the Tower of 
Babel character of the discussion: some take the message of determinism to [be] 
clear and straightforward while others find it vague and hopeless…. Here we 
have, the cynic will say, a philosophical topic par excellence!
1
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The history of philosophy is lined with debates that critically hinge on a notion of what 
determinism is or the truth of determinism. The most famous of these debates, of course, being 
on the compatibilism of free will and determinism. A less famous metaphysical debate involves 
the compatibility of determinism and chance. Though answers to both of these debates depend 
quite heavily on a conceptual definition of determinism, philosophers involved in these debates 
seem to rely on rather vague notions of the central concept. This phenomenon could be due to the 
an apparent simplicity of the concept or because the concept itself is inherently vague. John 
Earman points out this problem in the introduction to A Primer on Determinism. Earman’s 
Primer is supposed to provide some conceptual clarity on both what determinism is and what it 
means to call something deterministic. Since my thesis is intimately linked to determinism I will 
follow Earman’s lead in explicating a working definition of determinism that I will use for the 
remainder of this thesis.  In this chapter I will work through the historical development of 
determinism to arrive at John Earman’s formulation of Laplacean determinism. Using these 
insights, I will spell out what it would mean for the world to be deterministic. Specifically, I will 
                                                     
1
 Earman (1986)  p.1 
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briefly investigate the determinism or indeterminism of certain physical theories including 
classical mechanism and quantum mechanics.  
 
I. DEFINING DETERMINISM  
  
When we think about determinism we normally think of it in relation to events. If we think 
we live in a deterministic world, we think that, any event X is determined. Usually when we say 
something is determined we use it to mean that the outcome was already set and could not have 
occurred in any other way. Our intuitions on determinism can be teased out through a simple 
example using bouncing balls. If I drop a large amount of bouncing balls into a container, and 
our world is deterministic, then the balls actions will unfold in one and only one way. We also 
think that if we know all the laws and conditions affecting the balls’ behavior then we, in 
principle, should have epistemic access to every outcome of every bounce.  
 
a. Fatalism  
 
It is this intuition that scares the fans of human agency. It is thought that if determinism is 
true then our seeming human agency has no power to change and control the future.  This 
intuition also becomes linked in our human mind with fatalism and destiny. One of the strongest 
pre-Enlightenment connections between determinism and fatalism is seen in Greek civilization. 
In Greek mythology the Fates were goddesses who decided the course of an individual’s life. 
Individuals were to merely follow their life’s path and be subjected to the will of the Gods.  
Greek mythology is full of premonitions and oracles telling Greek heroes of their fate. The great 
Achilles knows he will die young but he also knows there is nothing that he can do to change this 
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predetermined fact. The link between fatalism and determinism is also seen in Wesley Salmon’s 
retelling of a famous legend.  
 
… the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, who was a slave, broke a vase 
that his master, who was a philosopher, treasured. When the master 
began to beat him, Epictetus protested, “By the philosophy to 
which we both adhere, it was predestined from the beginning of the 
world that I should break the vase; I am not to blame and I should 
not be beaten.” His master replied, “By that same philosophy, it 
was determined for all time that I should beat you,” and he 
continued to do so.”2 
 
This link to fatalism followed through to early Christian theology. The idea of the Fates 
was supplanted by an equally powerful Christian God. In both cases a powerful entity had 
control and infinite knowledge into a person’s determined future.3  
 
b. Causation 
 
Post-Enlightenment developments in science and philosophy brought us more 
sophisticated accounts of determinism. Causation became another more sophisticated concept 
tangled with determinism. This entanglement is derived from William James’ 1884 lecture at 
Harvard’s Divinity School. James declared that determinism is true when the fixed parts of the 
world “appoint and decree” what the future parts will be. James continues to claim that, if 
determinism is true “the part we call the present is compatible with only one totality. Any future 
complement than the one fixed from eternity is impossible. The whole is in each and every part, 
                                                     
2
 Salmon (1998) p.2. 
3
 Salmon (1998) p.3-4. 
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and welds it with the rest into an absolute unity, an iron block…”4 Causation creeps into the 
Jamesian notion of determinism. On a basic level Jamesian determinism seems to imply that 
every event has a cause, since the future state of the world must be “appointed and decreed” by 
the present state of the world, to be the way that it is.
5
 This conception of determinism links 
events in a determined chain of causality. The world can be thought of as a chain of dominos 
once one falls they all continue to fall in a set pattern thereafter. Another important aspect of 
Jamesian determinism is the idea of unity. This idea of unity holds that, “a difference at any time 
requires a difference at every time.”6 From the Jamesian picture of determinism we seem to get 
the view of a deterministic universe as a unified mechanistic chain of causal events.  
This vision, though seemingly intuitive, runs into several major problems. The first major 
problem is that the existence of causal chain does not guarantee against hidden possibilities. Just 
because every event has a cause it does not imply that the outcome of the antecedent event will 
always lead to one unique result. We can image the future world being caused by a present world 
but this does not mean that it was the only way it could have been caused by the present world. 
There could have been numerous indeterministic possibilities for that world to turn out. Another 
way to think about this problem is that if we were to run multiple trials of this world unfolding 
we could have numerous different future worlds from the same present world. Causation is not a 
strong enough concept to ground a future based determinism.  Another problem is that causation 
is a famously controversial and vague concept.
7
 Notions of causality and events are so vague in 
fact that they are not even used in physical theories and scientific practice. So to use these terms 
to explain another equally vague concept is an utterly hopeless endeavor.  
                                                     
4
 Earman (1986) p. 5 
5
 Ibid. p. 6 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid.  
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c. Predictability  
 
 Once the dust clears from the old notions of determinism the search continues for a 
conceptual meaning. The next major notion often used when in discussions of determinism is 
predictability. Predictability is introduced into conceptual formulations of determinism by Pierre 
Simon Laplace. Laplace’s definition of determinism equates determinism with predictability by 
introducing his famous demon.  
We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of 
its antecedent state and as the cause of the state that is to follow. 
An intelligence knowing all the forces acting in nature at a given 
instant, as well as the momentary positions of all things in the 
universe, would be able to comprehend in one single formula the 
motions of the largest bodies as well as the lightest atoms in the 
world, provided that its intellect were sufficiently powerful to 
subject all data to analysis; to it nothing would be uncertain, the 
future as well as the past would be present to its eyes.
8
  
 
This definition forms the basis of theoretical determinism with ramifications for math, 
physics and philosophy. Laplacean determinism has a very strong intuitive backing behind it, so 
intuitive that it seems to form the foundations for our quest for scientific knowledge. Essentially, 
Laplace states that if a system is deterministic then it must work in accordance with strict laws 
and absolute regularity. We can conceive of a deterministic system like the inside of a watch. On 
Laplace’s account if an all knowing intelligent being can observe the clock at time t1 and is able 
to tell the totality of the gear’s movements, then the system is deterministic. Mark Stone teases 
                                                     
8
 Earman (1986) p.7 
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out three requirements of Lapalcean determinism. These three requirements relate to: (1) 
algorithms, (2) unique evolution and (3) error.
9
 If we conceive of a deterministic system that is 
predicable then there must be an algorithm relating the information from the present state to the 
result of the prediction. As Stone states, “ …prediction is what enables us to determine an 
unknown state from a known state, and we do this by applying the known state as an input to a 
predictive algorithm.”10 The next requirement of Laplacean determinism is what has come to be 
called unique evolution. Unique evolution is the idea that one unique state always leads to one 
unique outcome. If the conditions are kept constant then a state should always produce the same 
outcome. We can conceptualize this by thinking of, as Robert Bishop does, a movie.
11
  If you 
watch a film in totality then restart the film, a film following unique evolution will play back 
every scene in the same exact way assuming all conditions remind the same. A film set up that 
would spontaneously spit out sequences of film would not follow the rule of unique evolution 
and would not be deterministic. 
12
 The final constraint is that a deterministic system can be 
described with a relatively small non-zero error. The prediction must be precise enough to be 
considered errorless.
 13
  
 Laplacean determinism has come under attack for its strong link between determinism 
and predictability. There are two major strands of attacks on the predictability and determinism 
link. One is full out conceptual assault that seeks to separate the two concepts, while the other is 
critique of the overall notion of the demon/predictor. The first critique is represented by Mark 
Stone’s argumentation in Chaos, Prediction and Laplacean Determinism. Stone, after laying 
                                                     
9
 Stone (1989) p.125. 
10
 Ibid. p.126 
11
 Bishop (2005) p.3. 
12
  Ibid. 
13
 It will be error less for the demon since our measurements as humans contain some error there will always be 
some small error involved in our prediction. 
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down the three criteria for Laplacean determinism, seeks to wedge a divide between the two 
concepts. He first attacks the idea that algorithms are predictive. Stones ask us to imagine an 
algorithm to predict the Nth decimal place in π. The problem for this prediction is that the 
algorithm would have to be an open-formed solution, which means, that all digits up to the 
predicted digit would have to be examined to get the answer. Stone contends that after this 
process we have arrived at a solution where we have not predicted the value at the Nth place but 
rather “inspected π.”  The algorithm we have used has not led itself to a prediction.14 Stone also 
argues that deterministic chaos creates a problem for Laplacean determinism. In Stone’s 
deterministically chaotic system changes in state are still regulated by an algorithm and this 
algorithm is closed. Stone contends that we will be able to make an “approximation” for the 
output of the system but it would be fraught with error. This leads to an additional requirement 
for Laplacean determinism. Laplacean deterministic systems must deliver accuracy in the output. 
According to scientific theories on chaos even if scientist could discover the controlling open-
form algorithm for the system, the system would work faster than the prediction; thus, for Stone, 
making the prediction not a prediction at all.
15
 Another feature of chaotic systems is that they are 
error amplifying. Since we always have error, deterministically chaotic systems will always 
amplify error thus rendering the demand for accuracy null.
16
  The lesson from the trip into 
deterministically chaotic systems is that there are conceivable systems that are deterministic yet 
that do not lead to the absolute predictability that Laplacean determinism demands. The bond has 
been severed.  
 Earman launches a criticism from another direction. Earman’s project is to search for an 
ontological understanding of determinism. In this sense, the idea of a predictor introduces an 
                                                     
14
 Stone (1989) 125-126 
15
Ibid. 126 
16
 Ibid. 127 
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unacceptable epistemological element into what should be an ontological discussion. He argues 
that the determinism that you will get from pure Laplacean understandings of determinism 
depends on the powers of prediction that the demon has. If the demon is all knowing then we get 
a strong determinism yet if the demon is like us and falls far from omnipotence then we have a 
much weaker determinism. This leaves us in a situation where we get no real sense of what 
determinism or a deterministic world actually is. There is a need to rid Laplace’s and future 
definitions of determinism of the demon that lurks within. Earman moves forward to try to create 
determinism without predictability as an essential component.  
 
II. EARMAN’S DETERMINISM 
  
Though Bertrand Russell makes progress in riding determinism of Laplace’s demon by using 
a functional account of what it means for a system to be deterministic, Earman provides an 
account of determinism using a possible worlds schematic.
17
 Earman’s reformulation requires 
there to exist some set of worlds with a particular structure. A world for the purposes of the 
reformulation is a “4 dimensional space-time world.” One of these is the actual world; the actual 
world is a world that is the collection of all events that occurred, are occurring and that will 
occur, where events are characterized as changes in spatio-temporal magnitudes. The rest of the 
                                                     
17 Bertrand Russell provides the final definition of determinism that influences Earman’s reformulation. Russell 
notion of determinism is important for Earman because it purges the epistemological demon from Laplacean 
determinism. In Russell’s determinism the state of a system can be represented by a function 
Et  = f (e1,t1,e2,t2,…,en,tn). 
 
where “e” are data from the system, “t” are times and Et  represents the state of a system at a time. A deterministic 
system is characterized by this functional relation and if t is a time within the function then the system is 
deterministic.
17
 The problem for Rusell’s notion is that it it is trivially true. Russell himself sees this problem when 
he states, “…the whole state of the material universe at time t must be capable of being exhibited as a function of t. 
Hence our universe will be deterministic…but if this is true no information is conveyed about the universe.”In  fact 
Earman could adopt a Russell function to describe determinism but he instead chooses to use possible worlds 
terminology.  
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worlds are merely possible worlds. A merely possible world on this account is a world with 
alternative histories to the actual world. With these components in hand we are ready to 
investigate Earman’s definition.  
  
Letting W stand for the collection of all physically possible worlds, 
that is, possible worlds which satisfy the natural laws obtaining in 
the actual world, we can define the Laplacian variety of 
determinism as follows. The world W ∈ W  is Laplacian 
deterministic just in case for any W’ ∈ W , if W and W’ agree at 
any time, then they agree for all times. ….This concept 
determinism can be broken down into two sub concepts. A world 
W ∈ W  is futuristically (respectively, historically) Laplacian 
deterministic just in case for any W’∈ W , if W and W’ agree at 
any time, then they agree for all the latter (respectively, earlier) 
times.
18
  
 
Earman’s determinism is essentially a supervenience statement. A system is deterministic if a 
certain state of the system fixes the past and future states of the system. In other words the future 
and past states supervene on the present state. Supervenience determinism severely limits the 
modal possibilities in a way that causation does not. When two things supervene on each other 
they are necessarily linked. So if the future state of the world W’ supervened on the present state 
of the world W it must always do so. If I were to do other trials of the world’s unfolding these 
two specific states of the world must unfold together.  Here we see the continued importance of 
unique evolution to both Laplacean and Earman’s determinism. If the world W and its identical 
copy W’ are isomorphic in respect to their properties and have the same laws then they will have 
                                                     
18
 Earman  (1986) p.13 
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the same unique evolution.
19
 Earman’s definition is meant to be the continuation of a purely 
ontological Laplacean definition of determinism with none of Laplace’s epistemology.  
Implicit in Earman’s formulation of determinism is a distinction between transitions and 
properties. This distinction is made clear by Earman’s declaration that determinism is not be all 
or nothing. What he means by this is that some of the world’s magnitudes can be indeterminate, 
thus meaning that a world can be partially deterministic with respect to those magnitudes.
 20
  The 
properties of worlds can be indeterminate but the transitions between states of worlds must be 
deterministic if these states of the world supervene on one and other.   
Earman’s definition can allow us to make metaphysical statements about determinism that 
the original Laplacean version cannot do without appeal to an epistemological force. While 
Earman’s determinism forms the basis of how I conceptually use determinism in the subsequent 
chapters I will not focus on all of his account. Specifically my use of determinism will be limited 
to Earman’s determinism futuristic Laplacean determinism and more specifically its upshot, 
unique evolution. In Earman’s determinism there seems to be the assumption that the laws of 
nature and time work symmetrically. If one thing is fixed in the present it fixes the past and the 
future. In looking at the compatibility of chance and determinism we seem focused on the future 
with the, perhaps wrong, assumption the past is fixed. We are looking to see if there is a real 
chance that an object will Φ in a future time. The forward nature of chances makes it especially 
important to look at determinism in a manner more akin to the futuristic Lacplacean model with 
special emphasis on the constraint of unique evolution.  
 
 
                                                     
19
 Bishop (2005) p. 3 
20
 Earman (1986) p. 14 
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III. DETERMINISM IN OUR PHYSICAL WORLD 
 
 With a strong Laplacean ontological determinism intact we can now figure out whether 
our world is in fact deterministic. But how exactly can we do this? Assessing whether the world 
is deterministic will depend on our best physical theories. This, of course, assumes some sort of 
scientific realism about those theories. In the following section I will assess two of the paradigm 
physical theories. One of these theories is thought to be thoroughly deterministic while the other 
is thought to be thoroughly indeterministic. Though I will not delve too deeply in these theories, 
it is important to see that our world could be either partially or fully deterministic no matter if 
our world works closer to Newtonian classical mechanics or to quantum uncertainty.  
  
a. Newtonian Mechanics 
 
A world that works under the laws of classical mechanics is usually taken to be a paradigm 
case of determinism. A pendulum is a perfect example of case where the laws of Newtonian 
mechanics satisfy the unique evolution component of Laplacean determinism. Newton’s gravity 
also seems to display the characteristics of a deterministic system. This is displayed from a 
mathematical standpoint. To understand how Newtonian gravitation could satisfy ontological 
determinism we must simplify the world into point particles with constant positive masses. 
Newton’s second law states that the net force acting on a particle is equal to the product of the 
mass of the particle and its acceleration. This of course needs a further supplement to describe 
the nature of force. This is where Newton’s law of universal gravitation arrives. This law can be 
famously described by the equation . This law essentially states that every point particle 
attracts another point particle with a force directed along a line which is proportional to the 
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product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between the point 
masses.
21
 If we check for the acceleration of the particle at a certain t and then verify that it its 
acceleration with the mass equals the gravitational force then we should get one unique 
mathematical answer.  
 From discussions of Newtonian gravitation and pendulums it seems natural to view 
classical mechanics as necessarily deterministic but there are some serious flaws in this line of 
thinking. Earman contends that our notion of the determinism of Newtonian mechanics rests on a 
particular conception of space, time and motion. He argues that Laplacean determinism makes it 
the case that space cannot be both absolute and that “all motion is relative to the relative motion 
of bodies.” Since relative motions imply only relative quantities and not absolute quantities like 
motion there is a certain space-time to support relative motion. This space-time include three 
things: (1) planes of absolute simultaneity, (2) a metric to measure the spatial distance between 
simultaneous events and (3) a time metric.  Absolute space in this space-time ultimately leads to 
different future positions for particles in space thus making the system indeterministic because it 
cannot hold relative motions.
22
  
Bishop states the problem for determinism and Newtonian mechanics in the following way. 
“The root problem…can be traced back to the fact that one’s mathematical theorems only 
guarantee existence and uniqueness locally in time.” So he concludes that “determinism might 
hold locally, but this does not guarantee determinism must hold globally.”23 Newtonian 
mechanics must not be completely deterministic. From these discussions it is obvious that 
classical mechanics is not as deterministic as it seems, furthermore it seems that of notions of 
                                                     
21
 Earman and Butterfield (2007) p. 234-235 
22
 Earman (2004) p.2-3 
23
 Bishop (2005) p.4-5  
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space, time and motion may make Newtonian mechanics, the paradigm of determinism, not be 
deterministic at all.  
 
b. Quantum Mechanics 
 
 Now that we can see that classical mechanics is not as deterministic as it is thought to be 
we must look at quantum mechanics under the light of determinism. Quantum mechanics, 
contrary to classical mechanics is thought of as a paradigm case of indeterminism. This 
perspective is seen in Einstein’s famous quote, “God doesn’t play dice.” This quote originated as 
a curt response to Max Born and Schrodinger and Heisenberg’s new field of quantum theory. 
Quantum theory is often thought of as indeterministic with regards to the particles that make up a 
wave. Particles that make up waves are thought to be indeterministic in terms of measuring 
individual particles evolution. Not only are these particles able to be measured in practices they 
cannot be measured in principle. But there are theories like the Pilot-Wave theory which state 
that a wave evolves deterministically over time thus determining the motion of the particles of 
the wave, so that the particles follow a unique evolution. This theory is compatible with quantum 
systems and determinism.
24
 What the Pilot-Wave theory does is allow for a phenomenon that is 
thought of as indeterministic and in the realm of quantum theory and proving a plausible way in 
which it could still be deterministic and follow the laws of quantum mechanics. Again we see 
that quantum mechanics may not be as indeterministic as it seems. 
 The lesson to take from our insight into classical and quantum mechanics is that the best 
theories of the physical world are indeterminate as whether they are deterministic. Classical 
mechanics is supposed to be the shining example of a deterministic theory yet, as Earman shows, 
                                                     
24
 Bishop (2005) p.5-6 
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this need not necessarily be the case. On the other hand the credentials of quantum mechanics, 
the paradigm of indeterminism, are called into question by theories like Pilot Wave theory which 
show a way in which determinism and quantum mechanics are compatible.  
The point of this discussion was not to provide a definitive answer to the compatibility of 
determinism and these physical theories. These topics are extremely complex and could warrant 
a complete thesis in their own right. What I hoped to do was show that the mechanisms (for 
which ever physical theory) of our world are a lot more complex then they seem at first.  Our 
world despite which ever theory may be true may show elements of determinism and 
indeterminism.  
 
CONCLUSION 
  
 In this chapter we have climbed up the Tower of Babel to arrive at a working definition 
of determinism. I have settled on Earman’s reformulation of Laplacean determinism, not because 
it is without errors, but because it is the best available option. Earman’s definition removes 
epistemological notions and confused and controversial elements of causation. This leaves an 
ontological determinism that is robust enough to investigate ontological questions about chance. 
It should be noted that from here on that the notion of determinism used in this thesis will refer 
to Earman’s reformulation with special emphasis on unique evolution. From determinism I dived 
into the world of physics. In trying to figure out the true indeterministic/deterministic character 
of our universe I showed that our best theories provide little conclusive results. This sets the 
stage for the question that will be the focus of the rest of the thesis. From the inconclusiveness of 
the scientific theories we can conclude that our world could very well be deterministic, or 
partially deterministic. We can also definitely say that deterministic universes are a possibility 
and that other possible universes might be deterministic even if this one is not. Knowing that 
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determinism is a valid possibility we can now turn our sights on investigating the metaphysical 
ramifications of deterministic systems on objective chance.  
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CHAPTER II 
AN UNHOLY UNION? 
 
Thus there cannot be deterministic chance. All there can be is deterministic ignorance. 
 (Schaffer 2007) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Our best physical theories of the universe have proved inconclusive on the veracity of 
determinism. No matter which physical theory happens to be true, be it closer to classical 
mechanics or quantum theory, there appears to be at least a possibility of determinism. Moreover, 
even if our world is not deterministic it seems that determinism could be true in some other 
possible world. It is with these possibilities that we must consider the metaphysical ramifications 
of determinism. The specific ramification that I will be investigating is the ramifications of 
determinism on chance. Are determinism and chance compatible? What would it be to have a 
concept of chance that was compatible with determinism? In the current chapter I will address 
these questions. I will investigate the contours of chance, what a deterministic chance could be 
and arguments for their incompatibility. Although this chapter will end on a pessimistic note by 
echoing Jonathan Schaffer in claiming that the major compabilitist theories of deterministic 
chance fail in the following chapter I will pursue a more positive account of deterministic chance.   
 
I. THE PROBLEM 
 It is the start of a football game and both teams come to the 50 yard line. At the 50 yard 
line a referee presents a fair sided coin with a side marked heads and a side marked tails. The 
referee asks one team to choose one side while the coin is flipping in the air. If the coin lands on 
the side that the team selected then that team gets the privilege of choosing how to start the game. 
This is an example of a coin flip. The intuition behind the coin flip is that a fair coin has 2 sides 
and that both of these sides are equally weighted, and that therefore there is a 50% chance that 
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either side is landed on. The simplicity of this case has made the coin flip a paradigm case of 
chance. But there is a deeper intuition that grounds the coin flip. When we flip the coin we 
believe that there is an almost undeterrmined future for the coin, meaning that there is an actual 
ability for the coin to flip either heads or flip tails. After the coin flip we think that it actually 
flipped that it could have flipped otherwise. This chance is what is referred to as objective 
chance. 
 Objective chances are not restricted to coin flips- they also seem to play a vital play in 
science. One of the most prominent examples of objective chances in the deterministic chance 
literature is radioactive decay.  Radioactive decay is seemingly based on objective chances and 
objective probability. Particular samples of radioisotopes are unstable and unpredictable. 
Scientists try to get a sense of the half-life of the isotope by assuming that these events are 
completely random. From this scientists observe patterns of decay by taking into account the 
chances and randomness of the behavior of the nucleus. In this case objective chance has an 
explanatory role in science. There are other examples of probabilistic laws in science but those 
will be looked at in greater detail in the following sections.   
 That seems simple. It seems to be an open and shut case- our world consists of objective 
genuine chances. This is the strong intuition that we act on and live our lives by but this like so 
many of our intuitions calls for stronger investigation. Let us turn back to our work on 
determinism. We roughly arrived at the concept of determinism as something like this the world 
in its current state supervenes on the world at a past time. This introduces us to the idea of unique 
evolution. If a system is to have a certain set of initial conditions then it will result in a unique 
outcome. So what does this mean for chance? It seems as though the progression of the world 
and its laws must already dictate an outcome of a “chancy” event(an event with an objective 
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chance between 0 and 1) if determinism is true, thus meaning that determinism and chance are 
incompatible. This is similar to the seeming incompatibilism of determinism and libertarian 
notions of free will. If determinism is true it seems the coin that we are flipping could not have 
flipped any other way than what it actually flipped. If the coin is placed into intial conditions of 
the same sort than it should always produce the same one outcome.  
 But this defines everything we have learned about probability. We know that the chance 
of a coin flipping heads or tails is 0.5 but if determinism is true than it must be 1 (it will occur) or 
0 (it will not occur). In a deterministic world it seems like there cannot be chances between 1 and 
0. What are we to make of this conundrum? There are two ways in which this problem can be 
solved. The first way is to declare the two concepts incompatible and to either argue there are no 
objective chances or argue determinism is false. The other option is to take the compatibilist 
track and argue for a deterministic conception of chance. The choice taken by incompatibilist is 
to claim that there are no objective chances and claim that the chances that we think come up 
between 0 and 1 are actually epistemic chances. Epistemic chances are merely our guesses of the 
likelihood of a future event. We do not know all of the deterministic laws of nature therefore we 
guess the outcome of the coin flip even though it is metaphysically decided. Epistemic chances 
comes from our ignorance. There is no open undetermined future and thus no genuine way the 
object could do otherwise. The epistemic or subjective chances have come under fire from a 
cadre of compabilist philosophers trying to craft room for an objective notion of chance. Before 
we dive into the compabilist accounts of chance we must have a deeper metaphysical 
understanding of the role we need an objective chance to fill.  
 
II. THE ROLE OF CHANCE 
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The incompatibilist position is strong and may characterize most philosophers’ feelings on 
the issue but it has not squashed the incompatibilist’s project. A few philosophers have tried to 
provide an account of deterministic chance. In order to understand how a determinsitc chance 
works we need a deeper metaphysical understanding of chance. In order to analyze chance I will 
be borrowing a critical distinction Jonathan Schaffer develops in his aptly titled essay 
Deterministic Chance. Schaffer makes the distinction between chance-formal and chance- 
substantive. 
A. CHANCE-FORMAL 
 A concept of objective chance is linked with an account of objective probability. Schaffer 
explicates a formalistic definition of chance which takes on a probabilistic character. He calls 
this account chance-formal because it is a based line definition with little metaphysical import. 
Chance formal includes three major parts: ‘p,’‘t’ and ‘w’ where ‘p’ represents the proposition 
that the event occurs‘w’ represents a world and‘t’ represents the time in which the event is 
occurring. Put together with chance we get ‘ch<p,w,t>’ which reads the chance of p holding at 
world w and at time t. The chance function also must have a component that explains that 
represents and that in our world there are chances between 0 to 1 that proposition p will hold. 
This leaves us with our formalistic account of chance: 
   Chance is probability function: ch<p,w,t,>→[0,1].25 
 
The interval in the function is to be read as between 0 and 1. So put in terms of a coin flip: 
ch<phead, w, t>→ [0.5]. This provides a formal representation of our basic understandings and 
intuitions of what a chance is. The problem with chance-formal is that by itself it does not 
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distinguish between epistemic and objective chances. A chance from that function could be 
between 0 and 1 yet be epistemic. What is necessary is more metaphysical meat on the strong 
formal skeleton.  
 
B. CHANCE-SUBSTANTIVE 
 
Schaffer provides a list of six generally accepted metaphysical notions to which chance is 
connected. The six notions are: the principle principal, the basic chance principle, the realization 
principle, the future principle, the intrinsicness requirement, the lawful magnitude principle and 
the causal transition constraint. The combination of these notions creates what Schaffer calls 
chance substantive. Chance substantive can give us a greater understanding of the metaphysical 
relationship between theories of objective chance and determinism.
26
  
 The first and most discussed of these requirements is David Lewis’ Principal Principle. 
Lewis’ Principal Principle (PP) was first introduced in his A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective 
Chance (SGOC) in 1986. The Principal Principle basically connects our epistemic belief in a 
chance occurring to the metaphysical chance occurring. Lewis begins SGOC begins by parsing 
notions of probability from chance. As a subjectivist about probability Lewis sees probability as 
nothing more an epistemological framework but he is trying to craft a space for objective 
chances. Subjective probability involves both credence and objective chances for Lewis. 
Credence is a rational belief in the outcome of an event. Lewis classes credence and chance as 
filling two different concepts of probability. He seeks to investigate the “second-order” 
relationship between these two concepts of probability, and more specifically credence about 
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chance. Credence about chance involves the rational belief in the chance of an event occurring. 
The relationship between the notions is what creates the Principal Principle.  
 Lewis believes that the Principal Principle encompasses all that we need to know about 
chance. He develops the principle through a four part questionnaire. The questionnaire is 
supposed to show the linkage of rational belief in the proposition about an event and the chance 
of the event happening. If a fair coin if flipped then there is a 50% chance that the coin will land 
heads but it also must be true that our belief in the coin flipping heads must also be 50% due to 
your knowledge that the coin is fair. The questionnaire also shows the importance of evidence in 
forming a rational belief.
27
 This leads to the Principal Principle. The Principal Principle has five 
major components: the credence function, a real number x, the proposition X and admissible 
evidence E. The credence function is “a probability distribution over (at least) the space whose 
points are possible worlds and whose regions (sets of worlds) are propositions.”28 The next 
portion is x where x is a real number. This real number is the chance of an event occuring at a 
certain time. The Proposition X is the “proposition that the chance, at time t, of A’s holding 
equals x.”29 What is admissible is represented by E. Lewis allows two pieces of information to be 
admissible: 1) historical information up to the time of the event and 2) hypothetical information 
about the chance itself are admissible. What is not admissible is the actual occurrence of the 
event. With these parts in hand the Principal Principle can be stated:  
   Principal Principle: C(A/XE)=x
30
  
 
The credence in A holding with the admissible evidence will equal the chance of the event 
occurring. Though Lewis may have thought this was this was exhaustive of chance, there seems 
like there are many more metaphysical components of chance. 
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  The next principle Schaffer borrows from Bigelow et. al. The borrowed principle is the 
Basic Chance Principle. The Basic Chance Principle, as stated by Bigelow et. al, is the idea that 
if we “suppose x>0 and Chtw(A)=x. Then A is true in at least one of those worlds w’ that 
matches w up to time t and for which Cht(A)=x.” The Basic Chance Principle states that if there 
is a non-zero chance that an event occurs at t in w then there is some possible grounding world 
where the event occurs which also matches the world w’s history up to time t. Since the possible 
world grounds the present world and they are the same until t, the chances on both worlds are the 
same.  Written in a Schaffer’s framework the Basic Chance Principle reads as this: 
Basic Chance Principle: If ch<p,w,t>>0, then there exists a world wground 
such that: (i) p is true at wground, (ii) wground matches w in occurent history 
up to t, (iii) ch<p, wground, t> = ch<p,w,t>.
31
 
  
The Realization Principle is very similar to the Basic Chance Principle. The only 
difference is that the Realization principle adds the requirement that the grounding world and the 
actual world match with respect to laws. The justification for this principle is straightforward. 
The laws of the universe fix the chance of an event occurring in the actual world so the same 
laws must be in place to ground the chance in the possible world.  
The fourth principle involves the future. David Lewis explains how chances in the world 
are time-dependent.
32
 Lewis uses the example of reaching the end of a maze to explain the time-
dependent nature of chance but I will use a rather morbid example to draw out this intuition. Joe 
was in a terrible accident and has been flown to the emergency room. If doctors cannot save life 
in an hour he will die. At the time of arrival, 11:00 PM there is a 50% chance that the doctors 
will be able to save Joe by 12:00 AM.  Its 11:30 PM and still no success by the doctors; Joe’s 
chance of survival has decreased to 25%. At 11:50 PM when Joe’s chances are at a mere 10% 
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the doctors fortuitously manage to perform the necessary operation for Joe’s survival. At 11:55 
the operation is done and Joe’s chance of survival is 100%. This example and Lewis’ labyrinth 
example are supposed to show that chance not only has a time dependent element but also that 
chance concerns elements in the future. Chance exploits the asymmetrical nature of time. This 
aspect of chance informs the future principle: 
  Future Principle: If 0 <ch<pe,w,t> <1, then t<te
33
 
 
The principle reads that if the chance of an event occurring is between 0 and 1 then the time of 
the event must be in the future.  
 The Intrinsicness Requirement is relatively simple. If an intrinsically duplicate is put 
through the same test under the same conditions then the chance of the duplicate Φ-ing will be 
the same in all duplicate trials.
34
 If I had three coins and two of these coins were intrinsic 
duplicates and the coins were flipped in intrinsically duplicate trials then the chance of the coins 
flipping heads should all be the same value.
35
  
 The Lawful Magnitude Principle is supposed to connect chances to laws. Schaffer states 
that the Lawful Magnitude Principle is: 
If Ptw(A)=x, then there is a lawfully entailed 
history-to-chance conditional of the form: if the 
history through t is H, then chtw(A)=x.
36
  
The LMP is supposed to show the close relationship between the laws of nature, through history-
to-chance conditionals, and the specific chance values. Where the BCP and the RP relate chance 
to worlds the LMP shows how chances work in relationship to laws. 
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 The last requirement of chance-substantive deals with causation. Arguments for objective 
chance often leave a place for chances to explain various causes and effects. Adherents to 
objective chances used radioactive decay and events like ice melting to appeal to this argument. 
But in order for this to be true the chance must be within the transition. Outside of the transition 
the chance has no impact. Schaffer calls this the Chance Transition Constraint. 
Casual Transition Constraint: If ch<pe, w, t> plays a role in the causal 
relation between c and d, then teϵ[tc, td].
37
 
 
 With these principles complete Schaffer’s chance-substantive. In conjunction with 
chance-formal we have a complete definition of what an objective chance must be.  
Chance: Chance is the probability function from 
propositions, worlds, and times onto the closed unit interval, 
which best satisfies: (i) the Principal Principle, (ii) the 
Realization Principle, (iii) the Futurity Principle, (iv) the 
Intrinsicness Requirement (v) the Lawful Magnitude 
Principle and the Causal Transition Constrain. 
38
 
A complete conceptual understanding offers much more than mere clarity. The new 
understanding of chance with these formal and substantive elements allows the theories of 
chance to be adjudicated.  
 
 
C. TYPES OF CHANCE 
Beyond a conceptual understanding of chance Schaffer also explains the various types of 
deterministic chances that have been argued for. In the philosophical literature there is a tradition 
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of dividing phenomenon into macro and micro events and objects. Micro-events and objects are 
things on the microscopic molecular level. They are objects like atoms, and quarks and events 
like molecular bounding and fusion. Macro-events, on the other hand, are large perceivable 
objects and events that involve a large complex collection of micro-objects and events. Chances 
also fall parasitically onto this divide. Micro-chances are chances that involve micro-events and 
objects. The chance of an electron doing something would be a micro-chance. Macro-chances 
are chances involving macro-events and objects. Coin flips are macro-chances. 
 Chances are also divided by the time of their occurrence. The divide here is between 
initial and posterior chances. Initial chances are chances that happen at the beginning of 
everything. A chance at the Big Bang would be an initial chance. Posterior chances are chances 
that occur after this the initial start of the universe. Coin flips, radioactive decay, reaching the 
end of a maze all fall under the title of posterior chances.  
From these distinctions we get four distinct types of chances. There are micro-initial 
chances, micro-posterior chances, macro-initial chances and macro-posterior chances. Micro-
initial chances are chances that occur on the micro-level at the beginning of the universe. The 
chance of a particle performing a certain action at the Big Bang would satisfy a micro-initial 
chance. A macro-initial chance would also be at the beginning of the universal but occur at a 
higher level. Micro-posterior chances involve chances that occur after the begging of time and 
are on the micro-level and macro-posterior chances are chances that also occur after the 
beginning of time but on a macro level.
39
 Theories of chance will be compatible with some or all 
of these chances. The role of chance and the types of chance give us a clearer means for 
evaluating the theories of objective chance and provide a meeting point to assess compatibilism. 
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III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND THEORIES OF OBJECTIVE CHANCE 
 There are at least four arguments for the existence of deterministic chances.
40
 In this 
section I will divide these four into two based on their strength in the literature on deterministic 
chance. The first camps that I will briefly analyze are the less successful arguments deterministic 
chances. These arguments include the no connection argument, paradigm chance argument, and 
the non-reduction argument. The second camp that I will analyze provides more than just a mere 
argument for compatibilism they provide a theory of what chances are. This group roughly is 
made up of proponents that view chances as something close to propensities these theories also 
all take from the pulpit of David Hume and Best Systems Analysis of the Laws of Nature. The 
theories I will address in this camp in are those by David Lewis, Barry Loewer and Carl Hoefer. 
The theories from this camp pose the greatest threat for incompabilist so I will thoroughly 
analyze this camp (which includes battling a big bad bug). 
 
A. THREE COMPATIBILIST ARGUMENTS  
 
The no connection argument declares that there is no connection between deterministic laws 
and chance. Proponents see determinism as being a supervenience statement that links the past to 
the future outcomes of the world. They see chance merely as chance formal and relating to 
propositions at a closed interval of time. When the concepts are looked at in this manner there 
does not seem to be much of a connection. The paradigm case argument holds (1) that coin flips 
are paradigm cases of objective chance and (2) coin flips are deterministic systems. For these 
philosophers this entails that there are objective chances in our deterministic world even if we 
cannot explain their existence.  The next argument is nonreductionist.  This argument holds that 
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even though there may be determinism at the micro-level this does not work up to the macro-
level. The macro-level would have to have an independent reality from the micro level and it is 
in this reality where chance roams free. This is a compatibilist account of chance because the 
world is still deterministic and chance coexists in one world. 
 Each of these arguments for the existence of objective chances in a deterministic world is 
compatible with a certain type of chance. The no-connection argument is compatible with all of 
the types of chances since it finds no problem in having determinism and objective chances. The 
paradigm case argument is wed to deterministic posterior macro chances of both varieties.
41
 
Since the paradigm example is a macro event (coin flipping) the paradigm case argument is 
committed to the existence of these macro-chances. Since the non-reductionist argument is 
committed to the determinism on the micro-level and indeterminism and the macro-level they 
explicitly support macro-chances.
42
 
 Schaffer provides in-depth arguments as to why these argument’s types of chances fail 
but I will provide more basic attacks on these arguments and will attempt to show that they are 
too troubled to be taken seriously as providing solid arguments for objective chances. The simple 
problem with the no-connection argument is that it is too restrictive in how it looks at chance. 
The proponents of this argument see chance only as a probability function stretching across 
propositions. As we have seen before an objective chance must have a much greater role. The 
metaphysical implications of objective chances connect chance to determinism. The paradigm 
case fails because it ignores the fact that a coin-flip does not necessarily represent an objective 
chance. The chance of a coin flipping a certain way could represent an epistemic chance. The 
                                                     
41
 In order to see how the paradigm example argument supports macro-initial chances it is important to realize that 
the paradigm argument is not just unique to coin flips. That is just one chance. A compatible macro-initial paradigm 
would be the Big Bang. 
42
 The non-reductionist also may not support deterministic macro-chances. 
30  
 
defender of paradigm chances needs a further argument to show why the chances resulting from 
coin flips in a deterministic world are true objective chances and not measures of our lack of 
knowledge. The final non-reduction argument is flawed in the sense that it relies heavily on the 
notion of a mysterious independent reality. The previous arguments have not seemed to gain 
much steam in the literature most like because of these flaws and ambiguities. The next batch of 
theories has a much stronger philosophical framework and poses a serious threat to 
incompatibilist.  
B. THE HOLY TRINITY: HUME, LEWIS AND CSM 
The following arguments for the existence of objective chances also offer a theory of 
objective chances. But beyond all offering a theory of objective chances they all take from 
Humean metaphysics.  David Lewis carries the torch of Hume into 20
th
/21
th 
philosophy with his 
Best System analysis of the properties of the world and the laws of the world. Lewis’ Best 
System Analysis creates a theory of objective chances. Barry Loewer marries this Lewisian 
theory of chance to Classical Statistical Mechanics. Finally Carl Hoefer offers an alternative to 
Lewisian chances but still maintains a Humean framework. 
Lewis starts off with an understanding of chance that seems to lead him towards a propensity 
account of chance but then diverges from the projected pathway. Lewis thinks that chances are 
given by propositions in the language of physics that say that an event will occur at a particular 
time and in a particular location. Chance, for Lewis, relies on the future, is an essential part of a 
causal nexus and adheres to the Principal Principle. To provide a theory of chance Lewis relies 
heavily on his Humean metaphysical picture of the world. The doctrine of Humean Supervience 
is an essential part of understanding Lewisian chances. Humean Supervience is the doctrine that 
the truths of the world supervene on spatio-temporal categorical properties. These truths include 
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the laws of nature.
43
 In the tradition of philosophy of science there has been much discussion of 
what exactly is a law of nature is. Lewis answers this question there this Humean framework and 
with a position that he calls the Best Systems Analysis (BSA). Laws, on Lewis’ account, are 
regularities. Consistent with the doctrine of Humean Supervience they are fixed by the 
categorical properties of the universe. When analyzing the theories of science the fundamental 
base is represented by L. Suppose that L is a language of fundamental properties, atomic 
predicates, spatio-temporal predicates and mathematics and logic. Theories represent deductive 
systems of laws that supervene on truths expressed in the language of L. These laws are the 
truths of the theory that best balances the properties of strength, fit and simplicity.
44
 These 
deductive systems represent the best systems. This is where chances make their entrance into the 
Lewisian picture.  
Chances and probabilistic statements enter in the Best System Analysis. The probabilistic 
laws of science are entered into the deductive system. The entrance of these probabilistic laws 
increases the fitness of the general theory. In this relationship is the definition of chance. Lewis 
states that “… chances are what the probabilistic laws of the best system say they are.”45 The L-
laws entail L-chances and the laws are in turn fixed by the categorical properties within L. 
Loewer accepts Lewis Best Systems analysis and tries to expend it to make sense of physical 
theories that include probabilities. One such theory that combines determinism and probabilities 
is classical statistical mechanics. The strand of classical mechanics that Loewer explains has 
three main postulates. The first postulate is that there are fundamental dynamical laws. These 
laws are deterministic. The second postulate involves probability. It declares that there is “a 
uniform probability distribution the micro-canonical distribution over the possible phase points 
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at the origin of the universe…” The final postulate is a statement that the origin of the universe 
was a “special low-entropy condition.”46 CSTM needs objective chances since it places so much 
causal and explanative significance in probability. An example of the significances of object 
chances to CSTM involves an explanation of why ice melts: 
The explanation proceeds roughly by citing that the initial macro 
condition of the cup of water + ice is one in which on the micro-
canonical probability distribution it is overwhelmingly likely that 
in a short amount of time the cup+ice cube will be near 
equilibrium; i.e. the ice cube melted. If the probability appealed to 
in the explanation is merely a subjective degrees of belief then how 
can it account for the melting of the ice cube?... The explanation 
within CSTM for the lawfulness of these generalizations invokes 
the microcanonical probability distribution. Now it just seems 
incredible that what endows these generalizations with their lawful 
status is a subjective probability distribution. Surely what the laws 
are is not determined by our degrees of belief.
47
 
 
This need for objective chances creates a paradox for CSTM. If dynamical laws are deterministic 
and deterministic laws are incompatible with probabilities then it would seem like we must hold 
that the probabilities involved are subjective. But it seems as though CSTM needs objective 
chance because subjective probabilities cannot ground laws.
48
 Loewer believes that Lewis Best 
Systems is the best theory of chance to solve this paradox. The paradox of CSTM is solved 
because CSTM represents the candidate for a best system. The postulates of the system are the 
dynamical laws and the probability distribution at the initial conditions of the universe and the 
condition of low entropy. “The contingent generalizations [the CSM system as a best system] 
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entails are laws and the chance statements it entails give the chances.”49 Since the probabilities 
that are in a classical statistical system are part of a strong, fit, informative Best System they are 
laws. This is how the objective probabilities ground laws and since they are distributions at the 
initial conditions of the universe they escape the conflict with dynamical laws. Here we have the 
marriage of BSA and CSTM to provide a Humean account of objective chances.  
 Carl Hoefer provides a differing Humean picture of chance.  Hoefer declares that his 
view is like Lewis’ but without the reduction to the microphysical level. Hoefer follows Lewis in 
two key ways: (1) he adheres to the Principal Principle and (2) he views objective chances as 
entailed by “patterns of events” in the world rather than being properties or propensities. Hoefer 
provides a list of five features of his theory of chance. The first principle links chances to 
structure and logic Chances are probabilities of outcomes from a “proper chance-setup” and 
derivable from logic and “probabilistic” axioms. Hoefer keeps Humean Supervience at the 
second feature of his chances. The principal principle represents the third leg of his third way on 
chances. The fourth feature is that objective chances are grounded by the fact that events, even 
though on many level they appear random, they have a stable distribution over time. This is 
supposed to make the theory consistent with the principal principle. The final feature is that some 
macroscopic chances supervene on the structure of the chance-setup. This is linked to Nancy 
Cartwright idea of Stochastic Nomological Machines that generate regularities.
50
 Not all 
objective chances come from this machine but if a chance set-up produces enough stability and 
randomness over history then that stability and randomness constitutes an objective chance.
51
  
 All three of the above mentioned theorist come from a Humean anti-necessitarian 
background. All three also agree that chances are entailed by a vast mosaic of patterns. Loewer 
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follows Lewis into the best-systems camp that ground chances in a deductive system of which 
there are probabilistic laws while Hoefer grounds chances in the long run pateerns of outcomes 
of chance. Both Lewis/Loewer and Hoefer rely heavily on the idea of chance as a supervient 
property. It is this reliance on supervience that leaves them open for attack. Objective chances of 
the Humean variety will have to overcome a big bad bug lurking in the distance.   
IV. ATTACKS ON HUMEAN CHANCES 
There are two attacks that the Humean project must overcome. The first of these problems is 
the infamous big bad bug. The bug, as we will see, causes problems for the Principal Principle. 
The second line of attack comes from comes from Jonathan Schaffer’s attacks on initial and 
posterior chances.  
A. THE BIG BAD BUG 
 
To understand the bug it is necessary to go back over chance and supervenience. On 
Lewis’ account chances supervene on the total history of the world and a complete theory of 
chance. This is where the supervenience relationship comes into conflict with the Principal 
Principle. The Principal Principle states: C(A/XE)=x with the supervenience relationship taken 
into account we can reformulate this relationship to C(A/HT)=x, so where H represents the intial 
history and T represents the complete chance theory. With further derivation we get 
C(A/HT)=P(A). The statement we are left with is that the credence in A is conditional on the 
initial history and a theory of chance and that that credence should equal the probability of A. 
The problem come in what philosophers call undermining futures. The problem is that possible 
non-actual futures in conjunction with the initial history produce the chance theory which relies 
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on the actual present chances. The Principal Principle The chance-theory cannot accommodate 
possible futures.
52
  
Lewis and Hall try to reformulate the Principal Principle to avoid this problem this 
becomes known as the New Principle.
53
 They formulate the principle in a way that changes the 
focus of the credence. Rachel Briggs states: “NP states that a rational agent’s credence in a 
proposition, conditional on a complete theory of chance, equals her expectation of its conditional 
chance, given the same theory.”54 On the other hand, the Principal Principle only stated that an 
agent’s credence is equal to the chance of the event. The new Principle stands as this: 
C(A/HtwTw)=Ptw(A/Tw). This is referred to as the New Principle. The New Principle gets around 
this problem by placing the credence in the complete theory of chance rather than the chance of 
an event.  
Though this move seems like a solution Briggs concludes that it relies on an incorrect 
theory of chance. She argues that there are two ways in which chance can be viewed. View 1 is 
that chance is what she calls a database-expert. Database-experts get their strength by having 
more information than others. The analogy she uses is to that of an eyewitness. Eyewitnesses are 
valuable because they have more information than those who were not at the scene. The credence 
function of someone being advised by the eyewitness is represented as: C(A/G(A) = x) = x, 
where G represents the expert’s advice. On the other hand there is the analyst-expert the analyst 
expert is like a relationship columnist. Her expertise is not based on having any more specific 
knowledge of the situation but being able to analyze the situation and offer advice. The credence 
of someone following this expert’s advice is: C(A/G(A/E)=x)=x. Where this fits into a critique of 
the NP is that the database rule represents PP while the analyst rule represents the NP. The NP 
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represents chance as an analyst. Briggs concern is that Hall by assuming chance is like this is 
moving in an un-Human direction. If Humean supervenience is true chance as a witness knows 
both the past and knows the future. It is on this knowledge or supervenience on the future that 
chance give advice, if the future were different there would be different advice.  In this sense 
chance seems more like an eyewitness than an analyzer.
55
 Briggs also offers a direct criticism of 
Hoefer’s theory of chance by arguing that it does not avoid the bug. What we seem to have are 
two theories that have not solved the infestation or have solved it at an unacceptable price.  
 
B. SCHAFFER’S ATTACK 
 
Schaffer attacks the Humeans in a more general attack on the type of chances that they 
posit. Rather than attack the bug and using a strategy to show an inconsistency between HS and 
objective chances he argues that their chances are incompatibile with chance-substantive and 
thus cannot fill the role of what we need an objective chance to be. Humean chances are maco-
initial chances. They represent macro-initial chances because they exist from probabilistic laws 
distributed at initial conditions, according to Loewer. Schaffer contends that initial chances 
violate: the principal principle, the lawful magnitude principle, the intrinsicness requirement and 
the causal transition connection.  
To show that initial chances violate the principal principle, we can consider similar 
reasoning as the big bad bug argument. When explaining why initial chances violate the Lawful 
Magnitude Principle Schaffer directly refers to Loewer. The three postulates of classical 
statistical mechanics are supposed to ground the existence of macro-chances. These postulates 
are in turn supposed to represent a best system. Schaffer gives two major flaws in this argument. 
The first problem is that the fundamental base L can only contain natural categorical properties 
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amongst other things of which low entropy is not one of them. The third postulate takes CSM out 
of the running to be a best system. The second problem is that CSM has shift competition that 
Loewer does not consider. This fact casts doubt on CSM being the ground of macro-chances.
56
 
The initial chances run into conflict with the intrinsic requirement. Initial events that happen at 
the big bang cannot be replicated but if we imagine a recurring eternal oscillating occurrence 
from the big bang Schaffer contends that this leads us to posterior chances. Finally initial 
chances fall outside of a causal nexus. In the ice example the chance must come between the 
event of the ice entering the cup and the ice’s melting. In the case of initial chances the chance 
falls outside of the event and is stuck at the big bang.
57
 
CONCLUSION 
The overview that I have given has been pessimistic towards the prospect of a deterministic 
chance. I have followed the scholarship to show that the best opponent of incompatibilism is 
actually plagued with many problems. From bug infections to conflicts with the role of chance 
the current crop of theories seem to fail to encapsulate what we need from an objective chance. 
In the next following I will evaluate a position that links chance to ability and ‘can’ statements 
and will work towards a new account of chance. 
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CHAPTER III 
ABLE BODIES 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The prospect of a deterministic account of chance seems bleak.  In the last chapter we 
examined the arguments for a deterministic account of chance and the types of chances that these 
arguments allow. We have seen that these accounts are not sufficient for an account of 
deterministic chance. But through our investigation we found several roles that an objective 
chance must fill. An objective account of chance that is compatible with determinism must 
adhere to the Realization Principle, the Basic Chance Principle, the Principal Principle, the 
Future Principle, the Intrinsicness Principle, the Causal Transition Constraint and the Lawful 
Magnitude Principle. These principles seem to provide a formidable criterion for any theory of 
deterministic chance. Schaffer concludes that there can be no account of chance that wades 
through this gauntlet of principles but Antony Eagle is more optimistic. In his 2011 essay, aptly 
titled Deterministic Chance, Eagle examines another critical element of objective chance. He 
adds a new constraint that he believes can eventually lead to an account of deterministic chance. 
This new principle is called the Chance-Ability Principle. This chapter will be devoted to an 
explication of this principle and its role in potentially shattering claims of incompatibility.  
 
 
I. THE CHANCE ABILITY PRINCIPLE (CAP) 
 
Eagle begins by trying to simply understand what makes certain basic sentences about 
chance false. He analyses two obviously false sentences. These sentences are:  
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a. This coin can land heads when tossed; still, it has no 
chance of landing heads when tossed  
And 
b. This coin can’t land heads when tossed; still it has some 
chance of landing heads when tossed.
58
 
 
Eagle analyzes the falsity of these sentences. Structurally these two sentences are composed of 
two conjuncts.  Both conjuncts have a truth component. ‘This coin can land heads when tossed’ 
can be true or false. Similarly, the latter conjunct ‘it has no chance of landing heads when tossed’ 
can also be either true of false. This is important because it grounds the problem with these 
sentences. What makes them false is the truth of one of the conjuncts excludes the truth of the 
other.  But what grounds the truth of the conjuncts is an important word in the first conjunct. 
This word is ‘CAN.’ If the object ‘CAN’ do the action in question then the conjunct is true. For 
Eagle this is what grounds chance. “The simplest explanation for this…is that ascriptions of non-
zero chance entail, and are entailed by, ‘CAN’ claims.”59 The ‘CAN’ claims are to be thought of 
as dynamic “ascriptions of ability.”60 Following CS Pierce he asserts that chances rather than 
being merely connected to “bare abilities” are embedded in habitual generalizations derived from 
a chance setup. By this Eagle means that a proposition like ‘The dice can roll six’ is linked to a 
habit for the dice to roll six. This habit is expressed as ‘X Фs when C.’ This expression leads into 
a principle that links chance, ‘CAN’ claims and ability together. This principle is called The 
Chance-Ability Principle (CAP). 
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The Chance-Ability Principle (CAP) Where X is a 
noun phrase, and Ф a complement verb phrase, the 
chance of X Ф-ing exceeds zero iff X can Ф. 
(Similarly, as ‘MUST’ is dual to ‘CAN’, the chance 
of X Ф-ing is one iff X must Ф.)61 
 
 CAP has larger implications for determinism and freedom as well as determinism and 
chance. Eagle supports a metaphysical position called universalism. Universalism about chance 
holds that every physically possible event has a chance other than 0 and 1. In a footnote Eagle 
notes another formulation of universalism. This formulation holds that there is a chance of truth 
of any physically possible proposition.
62
  The notions of physical possibility seem to work with 
positive non-zero chances. To say something is physically possible is to say that there are no 
contradictions in with the physical nature of our world that make the possible event impossible. 
If this is so then it seems as though there is a chance of the event occurring. Where universalism 
might run into problems is with past events. It is seems possible that there is a counterfactual past 
occurrence but this possible event does not have a non-zero chance of occurring, in fact it has a 0 
chance of occurring because it did not occur. But I think this supposed problem is unstable. In 
order to have a physically possible counterfactual occurrence time would have to be symmetrical.  
Were time asymmetrical and the past closed then the possible counterfactual occurrence would 
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not be physically possible it would rather be merely logically possible. The only way that a 
physically possible counterfactual event could have occurred is with a world where time works 
symmetrically. But if time were to work symmetrically then it makes perfect sense to say that the 
counterfactual possible occurrence could have a non 0 or 1 chance of occurring because in that 
world the past is not closed.   
This belief in universalism grounds the way in which Eagle reconciles CAP, determinism 
and chance. Eagle differentiates between how compatibilists and incompatibilists on 
determinism and free action view ‘CAN’ claims. The first view is that of the incompatibilists. 
The incompatibilists, according to Eagle, view ‘X CAN Φ’ as something like “It is not now 
settled that X does not Φ.” 63 CAP is consistent with the incompatibilists because in their view 
the object does not have the ability to Φ based on its present behavior of  not Φ-ing. The 
compatibilists by contrast can read ‘X CAN Φ’ as “X’s intrinsic state and immediate 
circumstances are consistent with Φ-ing.” Eagle states: “According to this view, X possesses an 
ability in virtue of the state of a region including X and X’s immediate surroundings.”64 These 
two ways of interpreting ‘CAN’ claims are supposed to show that CAP is capable with both 
incompatibilist and compatibilist perspectives on determinism.  
 The problem for these theories of ‘CAN’ for Eagle is that they are not flexible enough. 
The incompatibilist position takes ‘CAN’ statements to state some kind of truth in the future 
after the object has or has not Φ-ed. This does not account for the fact the we seem to declare 
‘CAN’ claims to be true even before they Φ.65 The problem with the latter interpretation of 
‘CAN’ is that it does not capture the appeal of incompatibilism and draws an insufficient 
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distinction between immediate and other circumstances. The insufficiency of these two accounts 
leads into Eagle’s own “more sophisticated account” based in on work of linguists.  
 The account that Eagle supports views ‘CAN’ as an “existential modifier over some 
collection of possibilities.” CAN claims are true if and only if there are possible situations where 
it Φ-ing is true. But there is still the problem that “can” and “possibly” are not the same, since 
there are possible situations that cannot happen. This theory gets around this problem by 
changing the base that is quantified over. For epistemic uses of CAN the base is epistemic 
possibility. So the ‘CAN’ in question quantifies over a much larger range of possibility. For our 
dynamic use of ‘CAN’ the base is physically or metaphysically possible worlds. The dynamic 
modal base is much more restricted.
66
 There is still some linguistic ways of speaking that escape 
this explanation and call for greater investigation. An example of this is comes from the work of 
David Lewis and involves a statement about the ability to speak a language: 
 
I can speak Finnish. 
 
Of course, for most citizens of the world, on first glaze this CAN claim seems to be false. I may 
be able to my own language or maybe the language of a neighboring country but I certainly 
cannot speak Finnish. But if we read the sentence as talking about my abilities in relation to a 
caterpillar that has none of the requisite body parts to even speak never mind a speaking a 
language like Finnish then it seems true that I can speak Finnish. I just do not exercise this ability 
because it was never taught to me. This seems to lead to a contradiction. ‘I can speak Finnish’ 
seems both true and false. How can this be? Eagle explains this seeming contradiction as an 
example that shows that statements like these are context sensitive. The truth of these statements 
is fixed by the context in which they are used in conversation rather than solely by the 
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constituent parts of the sentence. Context sensitivity fixes the truth value of these CAN claims 
through background propositions and presuppositions. If I am speaking in a context where 
people have been talking about the inability of a caterpillar to speak because of the lack of a 
larynx and then I say something like the aforementioned CAN claim, then it is fixed that I mean 
that the statement is true in virtue of me having the parts the caterpillar does not have. This leads 
to what Eagle calls the ‘IN VIEW OF’ clause. He breaks down ‘I can speak Finnish’ into two 
sentences.  
      
a. I can speak Finnish (in view of how my larynx is). 
b. I can’t speak Finnish (in view of what my schooling involved). 
 
The ‘IN VIEW OF R’ clause clears up any confusion from the original proposition. Both 
statements are true so we do not get the strange seeming contradiction that we got in the original 
proposition. In summation Eagle states his new CAN claim as ‘X CAN Φ IN VIEW OF R’, 
which in turn is true just in case there exists a possible world where X Φs while under the 
conditions in the restrictor R that is, that X’s Φ-ing is consistent with the restrictor conditions.”67 
 CAP is supposed to represent an integral factor of what it means to be an objective 
chance. Eagle does not offer CAP as a complete theory of deterministic chance but as a 
constraint on what an objective chance must be.  
  
II. CAP AND CHANCE ROLES 
 
Though CAP seems to do an explanatory job for objective chances there is one more 
hurdle for CAP. CAP must now stand in relation to the other principles that characterize 
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objective chance. These principles, introduced by Schaffer, are the Realization Principle, the 
Basic Chance Principle, the Principal Principle the Future Principle, the Intrinsicness Principle 
the Causal Transition Constraint and the Lawful Magnitude Principle. These are the principles 
and constraints that are accounts of objective chances must be judged against. Though CAP is 
not an account of chance it must be consistent with the other principles of chance in order to be 
included in the list of constraints.  
The first hurdle for Eagle is the Realization Principle. The Realization Principle is 
basically the idea that if there is a positive chance of something occurring than there is a 
compossible world with the same history and laws in which that event occurs. In other words 
there is a possible world where that chance is realized. Eagle views this as something that in its 
wording by Schaffer necessarily leads to incompatibilism between chance and determinism. 
Instead of flat out rejecting Schaffer’s Realization Principle Eagle digs further into the intuition 
behind the principle. He concludes the CAP and the intuition behind RP are consistent. Relying 
on the similarity between CAN and POSSIBLE Eagle concludes that the statement in the RP can 
be read as ‘there is a world in which that event CAN happen.’ As Eagle discussed before there 
are two ways view CAN, in one sense as an ability and in the other sense as a logical or 
epistemic possibility. Eagle concludes that the possible in RP though does not allude to which 
reading of CAN it would read it does not exclude the ability reading that CAP is grounded in.
68
 
The Basic Chance Principle is the next principle that Eagle checks to see if it is consistent 
with CAP. The BCP holds that if there is a positive chance of an event occurring then there is a 
possible world that matches that the world in which the event occurred up to the time of the 
event’s chance of occurrence. Eagle holds that the BCP and CAP are consistent in a similar 
manner. In the BCP the present ability of the event to occur is based in its possible occurrence. 
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This occurrence cannot be grounded in a merely logical but rather a dynamic reading of 
‘possible.’ The circumstances in the possible world must be similar to the present world in order 
for the possible world to ground the event’s occurrence thus restricting the notion of possibility 
to the dynamic sense. CAP and the BCP are intertwined to together and share common 
metaphysical elements.
69
  
Eagle reconstructs Lewis’ famous Principal Principle in terms of CAP. The Principal 
Principle links the chance of an events occurrence to the credence in the event occurring. The 
chance of an event’s happening is supposed to fix the credence or belief that the event will 
happen. Eagle reformulation states as such: 
 
…things X can do, should constrain our credences in 
various propositions about what things will do. We should 
assign no credence to X Φ-ing iff X can’t Φ, and we know 
it can’t. This is conjunction with CAP, entails the obvious 
truth that we should have positive credence in X Φ-ing just 
in case X has some chance of Φ-ing.70 
 
The link between credence and ability Eagle calls the Credence-If-Can principle. This 
principle states that if one believes that an event can occur than they should have a non-zero 
credence in the event’s occurrence. In conjunction with CAP the Credence-If-Can principle 
entails that “one’s unconditional credence in an outcome should be non-zero if one believes the 
chance of that outcome is non-zero.”71 This moves into the general statement of the Principal 
Principle, one’s credence in an outcome in conjunction with a non-zero chance should also be 
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non-zero.
72
 It seems like there is a possible problem in locating a connection between ‘CAN’ 
claims and credence. As a person who only speaks English it seems strange to say that there 
should be some positive credence in by ability to speak Finnish even though I CAN in the 
anatomic sense and even though I must have some positive chance in the universalist’s universe. 
Even though it seems strange to say such I think there should be a very minute belief that the 
individual will speak Finnish that corresponds to the minute chance of the individual putting 
together a Finnish sentence from the lexicon of sounds and noise that the individual has.  
The Future Principle derived from Lewis through Schaffer states that chances are found 
in the future. In the past there are no chancy events. This principle relies on our beliefs about the 
asymmetry of time. The statement that ‘X can Φ’ seems to implicitly imply the Future Principle. 
Since the past is closed if something can do something that it is not already doing it must do so 
or fail to do so in the future thus CAP is consistent with the Future Principle.
73
 
The intuition behind the Intrinsicness Principle is that the chance must remain the same 
amongst intrinsically duplicate trials.  If the trial is exactly then the chance should remain exactly 
the same. According to Eagle the same principle is involved here as when we ascribe abilities. 
When we think of two duplicates under the same exact conditions we ascribe the same abilities 
to these duplicates. If we have to coins that care exactly the same and placed in the same 
conditions then they should have the same abilities, behaviors and dispositions.  
The Causal Transition Constraint states that chance must be within the transition from 
one event to another in order for it to have a causal role. If there is a chancy transition between 
two events then that means that one of the events CAN and did happen. This means there was an 
intrinsic ability to Φ that causally existed and lead to the Φ-ing. This ability means that the 
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chance between the transition must be positive. Again we find that CAP and another 
principle/constraint are consistent.  
The final principle, the Lawful Magnitude Principle, Eagle bluntly declares that it and 
CAP are consistent. The LMP declares that if there is a non-zero chance than there is a lawful 
history to chance conditional. This connects chances to the laws of nature. Eagle states that if the 
laws are probabilistic and contain chances then chances are as the laws say they are. This means 
as Eagle states: “CAP then requires that the entities involved have a lawful ability to bring that 
chancy outcome about, which is obviously right.” 74 But the laws of science could of course be 
deterministic. This again leads us to our original question about the compatibility of determinism 
and chance, one that will be answered later.  
From what Eagle has argued CAP seems to fit in with the other substantive principles of 
chance. In fact in some cases CAP even seems to strength the other principles. So what are we 
left with? Eagle’s CAP does not provide us with a theory of chance but rather provides us with a 
new constraint of chance. In conjunction with the RP, BCP, PP, FP, IR, CTC, LMP; CAP now 
should provide a more complete account of Schaffer’s chance substantive. In order for something 
to be an objective chance it must be able to do the action in question.  
 
III. CAP AND DETERMINISM 
 
While the point of Eagle’s essay is not to provide an account of an objective chance he 
does spend a significant portion of the time showing that CAP provides grounds to have a non-
trivialized chance in a deterministic world. In doing this he takes on the incompatiblist argument 
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for the incompatibility of chance and determinism. Eagle sums up the statement of 
incompatibilism as: 
 
If a world is deterministic then no possible outcome in that world has any chance 
there other than 1 or 0.
75
 
 
What is of interest to Eagle is the phrase ‘HAS ANY CHANCE.’ When we take into 
account our discussion of can we can see that ‘HAS ANY CHANCE’ with CAP entails that that 
phrase is a “relative modality.” ‘HAS ANY CHANCE’ is grounded by ‘CAN’ and ‘CAN’ we 
have seen is context sensitive. The incompatibilist must hold the position that in all contexts 
there do not exist any chances other than 1 or 0. Eagle states, “The hardline incompatibilist, 
remember, has a severe task in front of them: to show that, even though ‘HAS SOME CHANCE’ 
is a relative modality, it is never the case that the contextually salient facts permit more than one 
outcome.”76 The compatibilists on the other hand must only hold that in some context there are 
chances that are other than 1 or 0. Eagle holds the view that there are such contexts where there 
are such chances. He argues that our ordinary language implies the existence of chances and that 
there is no reason to always consider the past and laws to be a relative context to ascertain a 
chance. In these contexts Eagle expects that the incompatibilist position with be a truth but these 
are importantly not all of the contexts.  
 The introduction of context in a discussion of objective chances raises many red flags for 
compatibilists. But it is important to see how the context that is so essential to CAP does not 
render objective chances epistemic. There seems something relative about context, in one context 
the sentence about the object can be true in the other context the sentence describing the object 
can be false. A person’s assertion that I can speak Finnish is true in one sense and false in the 
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other sense but it does not like it could be an ontological truth. How can I speak Finnish and not 
speak Finnish? The answer to this problem is that they are two separate propositions with two 
separate truth values. As stated earlier, ‘I have the ability to speak Finnish in virtue of my 
physiology’ maybe be true and ‘I have the ability to speak Finnish in virtue of my schooling and 
learning’ maybe be false. What is not changing here is any property, based on language and 
human interest, the only thing changing is which property and which proposition is referred to.  
 
IV. TOWARDS AN ACCOUNT 
 
Eagle’s CAP seems to get us to a place where we can see how objective chances can 
exists in a deterministic world. The pivotal aspect of CAP is that it seems to latch perfectly on to 
our intuitions about chance. When we think of the chance of an object doing something or an 
event occurring we think of a corresponding ability for that event to come about or that object to 
Φ. We now have a robust vision of chance that introduces the metaphysical notion of abilities 
into the debate. CAP also allows us to work with notions of context sensitivity and relativity. 
These new tools seem to help us with the intuitions that in some cases there seem to be 
determinism and some cases it makes sense to speak in terms of chancy events. It seems as 
though an account with CAP, with its reliance on language and context with have to make sure 
not to step over the line into epistemic chances. An account of objective chance will have to be 
metaphysically robust and CAP in addition to the other constraints gives the framework for a 
new deterministic chance.  
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CHAPTER IV 
BIRDS OF A FEATHER: PROPENSITIES, DISPOSITIONS and CHANCES 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Eagle’s Can-Ability Principle (CAP) provides the metaphysical skeleton for an account 
of chance. It provides a way in which to understand an objective account of chance in a robust 
non-trivial manner. CAP also shows us what would have to be true in order for an event to have 
a positive nonzero chance. Positive non-zero chances are grounded in the actual ability for an 
object to manifest a certain action. CAP connects chances with abilities; it is this crucial link 
where an account of chance will come from. However, CAP still needs to be supplemented by a 
metaphysical account of what the relevant kind of ability consists in. In the following chapters I 
will flesh out an account of chance that links the requisite abilities in CAP to dispositional 
properties. In this chapter I will critically analyze the dispositional propensity theories of chance 
offered by D.H. Mellor. After explicating Mellor’s propensity account of chance, I will show 
how his account fares given the current understanding of dispositions. I will continue to show 
that a link can be formed between abilities and propensities thus wedding CAP and dispositional 
metaphysics.  
 
I. THE GROUNDWORK 
 
There are several critical elements of the propensity theory of chance. The first elements 
of this account that are worth analyzing are the ingredients. Propensity theory views chance 
analogously to a phenomenon being investigated by scientific experimentation. Just as a 
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scientific experiment tries to capture a phenomenon through systematic testing and 
experimentation, chances in propensity theory are analyzed as the result of some systematic test. 
The test is to see whether the objects being tested will Φ and to find the chance of it Φ-ing. The 
system in which we perform this test is known as the chance-setup. For the event of flipping a 
coin, the hand and mechanisms of flipping constitute the chance-setup. D.H. Mellor echoes Ian 
Hacking in characterizing “a chance set-up as a ‘device or part of the world on which might be 
conducted one or more trials experiments or observations.’77 The individual tests of the object 
are known as chance-trials. Take a coin flip for example; the constituent objects are the coin, and 
the mechanist device for flipping may be someone’s hand. The hand represents the chance-setup 
while the actual flip that occurs represents the chance trial.  
On a metaphysical level the propensity theorist sees a strong link between chances, 
dispositions and propensities. Dispositions are very familiar to us in our common usage. We 
often analyze behavior in dispositional language, if I am angry person I may be disposed to act 
angrily (say, punch somebody in the face) in a certain context or with certain stimulus conditions 
(say, someone insults a family member). But also beyond our own psychological states, we 
ascribe dispositional properties physical states of objects. A disposition has three major elements 
which are important to it, the stimulus conditions, the disposition and the manifestation. The 
stimulus conditions are the relevant conditions that may bring about a manifestation and the 
manifestation is that outcome. The paradigm dispositional property is fragility. The antique vase 
sitting in your living room has the property of being fragile. Intuitively we think that this means 
that if the vase is put under certain stimulus conditions then it will exhibit a manifestation 
associated with fragility, namely breaking. If I were to drop the fragile glass from a certain 
distance we expect that it should break.  
                                                     
77
 Mellor (1971) p.67 
 52  
 
It is this close relationship between the stimulus conditions and the manifestation that 
leads to some providing a conditional analysis of dispositions. The simple conditional analysis of 
dispositions sufficiently and necessarily links the disposition to be analyzed to a subjunctive 
conditional which explains the disposition. So the statement ‘X is fragile’ is explained by the 
conditional ‘If X were struck then it would break.’ If the object does not break when struck it 
does not have the disposition.
78
  
But as famously noted this is not always the case. Objects like the vase can maintain their 
disposition even when they do not manifest it in the stimulus conditions. If the vase happens not 
to break because it is placed in bubble wrap or some wizard imbues it with a protective shield as 
it makes contact with the ground we still believe that object is fragile. Similarly when I fail to 
punch an offensive person in the face on one occasion I would still have the disposition to be 
angry but it was just not manifested at that time. This is called masking. The disposition to Φ in 
stimulus conditions X is masked but is still there in the object.  
Propensities are similar to dispositions. The usage of the term “propensity” in 
metaphysics and philosophy of science is heavily indebted to the work of Karl Popper.
79
 In the 
literature propensities have a rather vague and loose usage. Popper views propensities as real and 
objective properties of the world. But they are not properties that are physically visible 
properties.
80
 Popper conceives of propensities as dispositions. They are not exactly dispositions 
because they can vary by degrees whereas bare dispositions seem all-or-nothing. From their 
connection to dispositions we can see that Popper’s propensities are similar to their common 
English language usage.  These propensities are manifested in single events for Popper rather 
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than numerous events. Popper located probabilities and propensities in the single case. The 
breakthroughs of Quantum Mechanics and the intellectual problems caused by this paradigm 
shift lead Popper to see that causal role for probabilities and chances. In order for probabilities 
and chances to play a role causation there had to be something that grounded them with causal 
potency. This is where propensities come in the propensity theorist. Propensities are taken to 
have causal powers.  Quoting Wesley Salmon (1989) Belnap states: “Propensities, I suggests, are 
best understood as some sort of probabilistic causes.”81 In addition to metaphysical causal 
powers propensities are supposed to have explanatory powers. The propensity for an object to Φ 
in some sense is supposed to explain that object Φ-ing.  
 
II. MELLOR’S PROPENSITY THEORY 
 
Essential to propensity account of chance are this metaphysical groundwork. All 
propensity accounts use chance-set ups, dispositions and of course propensities. But where the 
accounts differ are in the location of propensities and their manifestations. D.H. Mellor provides 
a propensity account of chance which is counter to that of Popper. In explicating his account he 
begins by analyzing the link between propensities to dispositions.  
Despite Popperian argumentation there still seems to be something strange about 
associating propensities with dispositions. Dispositions are thought to lead to a manifestation in 
conjunction with certain stimulus conditions. If I was to drop a vase from the Empire State 
Building and the vase did not break we certainly would not ascribe the disposition of fragility to 
that vase. A vase that sometimes breaks and sometimes does not in these stimulus, Mellor argues, 
does not have one disposition of fragility but is rather fragile sometimes and not fragile at others. 
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But propensities do not work in this manner. It is essential that the manifestation of the 
propensity is not, as Mellor puts it, invariable. If, when a coin is flipped and it always lands 
heads it seems preposterous to say that it had a propensity to come up tails.  Also since 
propensities work by degrees and are not all-or-nothing they seem to be inherently variable. 
This leads to a dilemma. If dispositions manifestations are invariable then “either [a] 
propensity is not a disposition or results and outcomes of chance trials do not display it.”82 
Besides dispositions, another concept that a propensity could be are tendencies. Tendencies and 
dispositions are similar but dispositions seem to be stronger in the sense that they more strongly 
connected to the object. Tending to behave in a certain way is less strong having a disposition to 
act that way because not exhibiting the manifestation does not imply the tendency is not there. 
The only thing that would imply that the tendency was not there was if it not performs 
accordingly in the preponderance of trial run. What this boils down to is that tendency is a 
statement that the manifestation an object will behave in a certain way more often than not. For 
Mellor the problem of explaining propensity and chance in terms of tendencies is that is does not 
explain anything. To define chance in terms of propensities and then in terms of tendencies is 
circular. A statement that x has a tendency to A in C requires that there be some probability or 
chance that x will A in C because saying x has a tendency to A in C means the same thing as it is 
more probable that x will A in C than not A in C. The coin has a tendency to flip heads if it is 
more probable that it will flip heads or it has a higher chance of flipping heads. We are left 
explaining chance with chance.
83
  Being that the only other candidate for what a propensity could 
be fails Mellor takes the second route and maintains that propensities are dispositions but they do 
not occur in outcomes.  
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From the account of propensities, dispositions, and chances and their relationship to each 
other Mellor lays out his positive account of what a chance is. It is already evident that he 
believes chances to be dispositional properties and more specifically propensities. There are two 
important parts to Mellor’s propensity theory of chance; one part is the what- what has chances- 
and the where- where the propensities manifests.  
There are two candidates for the holder of propensities. The first candidate is the chance-
setup. Philosophers including Popper and Hacking hold chance propensities to be properties of 
chance-setups. The other candidate, favored by Mellor, is that propensities are properties of the 
entities involved in the event itself. For flipping a coin, proponents of the chance-setup account 
would state that the flipping mechanism, say the thumb placed in a certain manner and the whole 
system affecting the coin’s outcome has a certain chancy propensity for a manifestation. Mellor 
and the proponents of the entity view of chance would contend that objects in or undergoing the 
test of the chance set-up have the chances- so in the coin flipping case it would be the coin that 
holds the chancy propensity. Mellor contends that the previous view conflates propensities and 
chance and claims that this leads to the proponents’ misattribution of chances to chance-setups.84 
Mellor also provides an independent metaphysical reason for rooting chances in entities. He very 
clearly and concisely states his argument for his position. He states that scientific conventions 
pick out entities to assign properties to and objects are more real than complex chance setups. 
This is a mixture of an argument based in the practices of science and the practices of 
metaphysics. The attribution of properties to chance-setups would require that these chance 
setups exist as ontological entities just like coins and normal objects. For Mellor the problem is 
that in order to make sense of propensities in chance-setups we would have to add chance-setups 
to our ontological tool-box. Not only does this seem intuitively strange there also seems a much 
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more simple account.
85
 Intuitively and scientifically we attribute properties to “permanent 
entities.” We say that salt has the property of being soluble in H20 rather than the laboratory 
equipment in conjunction with the salt has the property of being soluble.  Another argument for 
attributing chances to permanent entities that Mellor does not pursue is that there is a sense in 
which we can say that objects have properties like chances and propensities minus any chance-
setup. If chances are located in chance-setups then it makes no sense to speak of the coin on the 
table having a chance or anything having a chance unless it is accompanied by a chance-setup 
putting it under stimulus conditions.  
After Mellor places chances in the coin he must now explain where these chancy 
propensities manifest in these coins. There seem to be two options for Mellor. Either the 
manifestation of chancy propensities can be found in the object Φ-ing or they can display 
themselves in the chance distribution. Mellor favors the latter.  He states clearly, “The display of 
a propensity is the chance distribution over the possible results of the appropriate trial.”86 The 
chance distribution refers to roughly the chance that the object should manifest rather than the 
outcome itself. This means that manifestation of the coin’s propensity is that it flips with a 50% 
of coming up heads and a 50% of coming up tails. An example Mellor uses of propensities’ 
displays is as follows: 
The display of a propensity or of any other disposition is not 
normally a chance matter. It can be made so, however, if for 
example we decide to toss one unbiased coin, a, only if another, b, 
that we toss lands heads. Otherwise a is to be turned tails up. We 
can make a machine do all this when we press a button, and the 
                                                     
85
 Mellor (1971) p.74 
86
 Ibid. p. 74 
 57  
 
chance then of a landing heads is 1/4, of it landing tails ¾. That 
indeed displays a propensity in the machine…87 
 
Dispositional invariability is important for Mellor. As was discussed earlier the dispositions 
without finks or masks should manifest themselves. But is this the case with Mellor’s 
dispositional propensities? It seems as though a fair coin will always have a ½ chance of coming 
up either heads or tails.  
 
III. PROPENSITIES AND CAP 
 
Now that we have excavated a propensity theory of chance it is essential to see how this 
theory relates to the larger debate on the compatibilism of determinism and chance. The Chance-
Ability Principal provides the link that a non-trivial chance will need. In order for a coin to have 
a chance of flipping heads it CAN flip heads and must have the ability to flip heads. We have 
already seen how propensities, dispositions and chance are interlinked on Mellor’s account I will 
now throw abilities into the fray in hopes of linking the propensity account of chance to CAP.  
Dispositions and abilities seem to be very close relatives. Just like with dispositions, 
abilities seem to remain hidden until put in some stimulus conditions yet this hidden aspect does 
not mean that they are not there. We can see that there is an even stronger link between 
dispositions and abilities. When an object has a disposition to Φ it also has the ability to Φ 
likewise when an object has an ability to Ф then it has some disposition to Ф.88 When I am 
disposed to lie in certain stimulus conditions then I must also have the ability to lie in those 
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stimulus conditions. Dispositions seem to supervene on abilities.
89
 The other direction also seems 
to work in a similar manner. If I have the ability to make a 3-pointer then there must be some 
stimulus conditions where I am disposed to a make a 3-pointer. Contrarily mask only work in 
one direction. Michael Fara argues that if an object’s ability is masked then its disposition is 
masked as well. The relationship seems not to work in the opposite direction. If my disposition is 
masked there is still a sense in which I could have the ability and act with the ability while not 
being disposed to. For example if my disposition to speak French when spoken to in French to 
was masked there still seems to be a way that the ability is still there.  
Propensities are intimately related to dispositions and dispositions are grounded by 
abilities but how are propensities and abilities related? Propensities, in the way that Mellor uses 
them, seem to also supervene on an ability to Φ.  Propensities are supposed to have some causal 
powers and in the Popperian sense are supposed to be ‘real’ like the Newtonian gravitational 
forces.  If I had a propensity to Φ, in the same way as if I have the disposition to Φ, I must have 
the ability to Φ. This seems to also simple follow from the fact that propensities are a type of 
dispositional property. All dispositional properties must have an ability to manifest themselves in 
the appropriate conditions as long as no finks or masks are present, propensities are types of 
dispositional properties so it follows that objects with propensities must have the corresponding 
abilities.  
As we have seen any account of objective chance in a deterministic world will have to be 
consistent with the Can-Ability Principle. CAP being the principal- that is if something has a 
nonzero chance of occurring then it CAN occur, where CAN is understood as the ability to occur. 
As our metaphysical linkage shows propensity theories like Mellor’s seem to be perfectly 
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consistent with CAP and even seem to flesh out and explain CAP better.
90
 If objects like coins 
have propensities to flip a certain chance distribution, 50%, then it clearly CAN flip with a 50% 
chance distribution. What makes it true that the coin has the propensity to flip with a 50% chance 
of coming heads is that it has the ability to do so.    
What the propensity theory of chance does for CAP is provides a theory of chance. CAP 
and the propensity theory of chance are consistent but where CAP stops short is actually 
proposing a theory of chance. It posits that chance and ability must be linked but does not posit 
how they are linked. We can see that they are metaphysically linked through these dispositional 
properties called propensities that reside in objects.  
 
IV. MELLOR’S FLAWS 
 
There are three major problems in linking Mellor’s account of chance with determinism. 
The first problem is that Mellor believes that the existence of working propensities precludes the 
truth of determinism. He states, “If propensities are ever displayed, determinism is false.”91 This 
obviously does not fit in with the intuition and the goal of CAP, which is to provide a principle 
that can make sense of objective chances in a deterministic world. In that sense it seems 
problematic to use a theory that assumes chances must be indeterministic to explain deterministic 
chances.  
a. Determinism, Propensities and Chance 
 
 In a latter discussion about the role of chances in the causal link Mellor restates the 
propensities are inconsistent with a deterministic except in what he calls in a “frivolous” sense. 
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This case is where there is an un-flipped coin. He declares it is consistent with a deterministic 
world that the un-flipped coin would have a propensity in the coin but not have a chance.
92
 But 
this is weak relationship between chance and propensities are problematic for Mellor’s account. 
There must be a stronger link to make sense of chance. Mellor’s dispositional account of chance 
is supposed to be an exhaustive account explanation of chance. If propensities share only this 
weaker relationship as Mellor seems to assume there can exists cases where there are 
propensities without chances and more importantly chances without propensities to serves as 
their grounds. In these cases we are left with an explanatory gap. To arrive at this problem let’s 
look back at Lewis’ maze example. There is a chance of me completing the maze by noon and 
let’s say I have a propensity to reach the end of the maze. Say I lose the propensity to reach the 
end of the maze; I am paralyzed and lose my vision. There still remains a chance that I reach the 
end of the maze by noon if propensities and dispositions are weakly linked together as Mellor 
declares that they are. There is a chance a hurricane could come along and blow my paralyzed 
blind body to the end point but the chance diminishes as time continues to noon. What we have 
in this situation is a chance without a propensity and a problem for Mellor’s dispositional 
account of chance.  With a stronger connection between a chance located within the trial and 
propensities the change in propensities can explain the change in chances that we expect. 
Otherwise if the chance cannot be located in the trial the chance cannot change or reflect any 
changes in the propensity. On Mellor’s account we are either left with a floating chance or an 
unresponsive chance, both of which seem unacceptable. In relation to determinism we must still 
explain how this chance-propensity relationship works with deterministic laws.  
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b. Chance Distribution 
 
Mellor roots propensities in the display of chance distributions. Even though this is a chance 
distribution, it has a metaphysical ring of mysterious around: it seems as though Mellor is 
proclaiming that objects have a propensity to Φ at a certain chance rather than the alternative that 
objects have a propensity to Φ. The coin’s disposition has been manifested when it flips with a 
50% chance of landing heads. The problem with this view is that there seems to be a gap 
between at the relationship between the chance distribution and the outcome.  
 There are problems that come from stating that the manifestations of propensities are 
chance distributions. The first of these problems is that if this were the case these propensities 
would be completely inconsistent with other dispositions and propensities. The manifestation of 
dispositional properties is always thought as the object Φ-ing. The fragile glass displays its 
fragility when it breaks when dropped at a certain height. My disposition to speak French is 
manifested when I actually speak French in the appropriate stimulus conditions. Dispositions 
work in this manner and propensities as dispositions should follow the same suit. Mellor’s 
propensities manifest in a strange and vague way. Not only is it inconsistent with the way that 
other dispositions manifest, this inconsistency seems to be at due to another problem in Mellor’s 
account. Dispositional properties are thought of to be objectively real. It is consistent with this 
view of dispositions that they manifest themselves in real ways, with actually occurring objective 
events. Chance distributions do not have the ontological realness that events have. Rather chance 
distributions seem to be mathematical devices with no reality or a reality fundamentally different 
than the disposition that they are the manifestation of.  
Mellor’s account of chance distributions has problems reaching the outcome of the chance 
trial. The outcome of the coin flip seems totally irrelevant to the chance and the propensity. But 
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it seems totally absurd to say that the outcome of a chance trial has no relation to the chance 
propensity. But how does Mellor make the outcome relevant? It seems as though there is no way 
for him to connect the chance distribution to the outcome and to have a meaningful chance 
outcome.   
c. Finks and Mask 
 
The last problem for Mellor’s account is that it predates writings on finks and mask. Though 
I mention finks and mask briefly, I purposely skirt the issue of finks and mask in explaining 
Mellor’s account. We can see the influence of finks and mask in Mellor’s discussion of 
dispositional invariability. Since he holds dispositions to be invariable he holds that they almost 
strictly follow the conditional analysis of dispositions. Mellor’s view of dispositional 
invariability leads him to argue that chances must be in chance distributions. Finks and mask cast 
doubt on this analysis of dispositions. They show that dispositions are not as invariable as they 
seem in fact there are cast where if they are put into their stimulus conditions they may still not 
manifest.   
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 As it stands now Mellor’s account has some major problems standing in the way of it 
being considered a successful account of chance. But there are many positive aspects of Mellor’s 
account that can be salvaged. There is strong reason to believe that chances are related to 
dispositional properties, and propensities. Similarly we see a promising link between a 
dispositional account of chance and the Can-Ability Principle. The remaining chapter of this 
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these will be devoted to a reworking of Mellor’s account to provide a new dispositional theory of 
chance.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
OBJECTIVE CHANCES IN A DETERMINISTIC WORLD 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
While Earman proclaims that determinism is a philosophical topic par excellence the work 
on deterministic chances has shown that many excellent conundrums arise from the implications 
of determinism. The possibility of a deterministic or partially deterministic world seems to cause 
problems for our notions of objective chance. In this thesis we have seen that in order to have an 
objective chance there are certain chance constraints that each candidate must adhere to, to 
which most of the candidates fail. I have also argued that Eagles CAP must be put into the 
pantheon of chance constraints. In trying to flesh out an account of chance from these constraints 
I relied on Mellor’s dispositional account of chance. But this account of chance is not without its 
flaws. In this chapter I will provide a dispositional account of chance which overcomes the flaws 
of Mellor’s model.  
 
I. A NEW DISPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT OF CHANCE 
 
Mellor’s account is full of problems but it is not unsalvageable. In the following section I 
will provide my account of chance which will hopefully take care of the problems of Mellor’s. In 
my account I will focus on keeping fundamental elements of Mellor’s account. My account will 
hold that chances are dispositional properties and give more metaphysical flesh to a dispositional 
account of chance. I will critically differ with Mellor on the other issues like the relationship 
between chances and dispositions and the manifestation of chancy dispositions.  
 
65 
 
a. Grounding 
Dispositions are properties came under attack famously from Gilbert Ryle. In The Concept of 
the Mind Ryle argues that dispositions have an occult like status. What he means by this is that 
they seems to not be real properties of objects but rather ghost like entities that are associated 
with objects. More recently, philosophers have tried to take the occult aspect out of dispositions 
by finding grounding for them. Dispositions are also thought to have a causal element to them; 
this again calls for a deeper look into the base of dispositions. It is widely, although not 
universally, accepted that dispositions are grounded by categorical properties. Categorical 
properties are brute physical properties like chemical structure. There are at least two ways at 
arriving at the conclusion that categorical properties ground dispositional properties. The first 
way is to argue that there can be glasses that are fragile and glasses that are not fragile. What 
must account for the differences in these glasses is some sort of difference in their physical make 
up. It makes sense to say one glass has a different chemical bonding and this is why it does not 
have the disposition. Now there may be second order dispositions but it seems that somewhere 
on the fundamental level there must be a physical base that grounds the dispositions. Another 
argument centers on the causal relevance of dispositions. If dispositions are supposed to be 
somehow involved in causal chains and these causal chains involve physical properties then it 
seems as though there must be physical bases that are involved in the causal chain. The 
crystalline structure of sugar is causally relevant to its dissolving in water.
93
 These arguments are 
made by those who favor what is called a realist position on dispositions.
94
 These arguments 
seem to be consistent with our scientific thoughts on causation and ontology. 
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If chances are to be thought of as dispositional properties or propensities which I believe that 
they should be, then they must also have a physical base. Deterministic chances seem to be 
perfectly grounded by their physical structure. Let’s take the example of the fair coin that is 
going to be flipped. The coin has two equally weighted sides. This corresponds to the chance that 
we give the coin. Since there are 2 sides the chance that it flips on one of those sides is ½. The 
same thing goes for a die. The die has 6 sides so the chance of landing on any of those sides is 
1/6. Deterministic chances supervene on the physical properties of the objects that have them. 
These physical properties like the structure of coins and dice serve as the categorical bases for 
the dispositions.  
Though the connection between physical structure and chances seems airtight it may be 
argued that on the quantum level there are chances yet there are not physical categorical 
properties to ground these chances. It is thought that particles at this level are just categorized by 
bare dispositional properties like spin, and indeterminate locations. This objection is sound and 
does raise a problem. I answer this objection through drawing a distinction between pure chances 
and deterministic chances. On the quantum level it makes perfect sense to just have pure chances 
but deterministic chances must have a physical base.  
 
b. Chances as Dispositions 
The link between deterministic chances and categorical properties shows that objects can 
have chances to do certain actions even before they are put through any type of trial. The coin 
has a .5 chance of flipping heads even before it is flipped. One can arrive at this fact by merely 
inspecting the physical structure of the coin. The coin has two equally weighted sides therefore 
there is a 1 out of 2 chance that it will land on one of those sides when flipped. Since chance is 
parasitic on this physical structure we can say that this chance is an intrinsic property of the coin. 
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The chance of flipping ½ is a property the coin has just in virtue of its physical make-up. While 
chances like these are intrinsic to the object not all chances are intrinsic. Chances that involve 
multiple objects are not intrinsic. The chance of one coin flipping heads when it depends on the 
outcome of another flip is an example of an extrinsic chance. Chances that are not directly 
connected to the physical make-up of the object are also extrinsic. Lewis’ maze is an example of 
an extrinsic chance that the agent has to reach the maze by noon.  
Intrinsic chance dispositions are properties of entities. All entities have a chance of 
performing some type of action inherently. The die inherently has a particular chance namely 
1/6
th
 of rolling a six if rolled and, as stated before, this is due to its physical structure. Physical 
structure is important in grounding chance it tells us that there are intrinsic chance properties but 
we still have no account of how these intrinsic chances work as dispositions. There are two 
options for the type of dispositions that chances could be. Either chance dispositions could be 
one disjunctive disposition or what Alexander Bird calls a complex single track disposition or 
multiple single track dispositions.  
On all accounts the die has a disposition to roll six and a disposition to not roll six. The 
question is merely where to be this other disposition. On the complex single track account 
instead of viewing the disposition to not roll six and the disposition to roll six as separate surefire 
dispositions we can see these dispositions as something close to a multi-track disposition. 
Surefire dispositions are those that are very closely related to the dispositional conditional 
analysis of dispostions. The conditional analysis of dispositions states that and object has a 
disposition to X iff in certain stimulus conditions S, X were to manifest. Surefire are dispositions 
like fragility that when they enter a stimulus condition necessarily (so long as there are not  finks 
or  masks around) manifest. When the glass is dropped at a certain threshold length in the 
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absence of interfering factors it must break or else it is not fragile.
95
 Multi-track dispositions are 
different in the sense that they can have different stimulus conditions and different 
manifestations. Bird and Ryle explain how knowing French is a multi-track disposition. There 
are multiple ways in which knowing French can be manifested. It can be manifested through 
writing in response to one stimulus or through speaking in response to another stimulus. As Bird 
notes certain multiple-track dispositions may be better noted a complex single-track 
dispositions.
96
 These are dispositions with one stimulus and multiple manifestations or one 
manifestation and multiple stimuli. Take the flipping of a coin. If I flip the coin in stimulus 
conditions S it seems like chance requires two manifestations the coin flipping heads and the 
coin not flipping heads. Whether these chances are multi-track or complex single-track 
dispositions they involve one stimulus condition with multiple manifestations combined by an 
exclusive disjunctive. The chance for the coin to flip heads is actually a complex disposition that 
involves under the same stimulus conditions the manifestation of it not flipping heads.  
But there is a problem for this view. The single complex disposition cannot differentiate 
between a biased coin and unbiased coin. In this sense we do not yet have chance. The 
disjunctive put equal value on all of the disjuncts, either it can flip heads or tails. But the problem 
is that in a bias coin and in other chancy events one option is weighted heavier. The disjunctive 
relationship is not sufficient to characterize chance there must be something indicating the 
strength of these manifestations. It cannot be that the other manifestations are masked because 
there is still a way that even though it is biased toward one manifestation it may very well come 
up. The only option seems to be to appeal to the mythic chance distribution that we rejected as 
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too vague and ontologically unreal. The manifestation’s strength would have to be based on 
some stronger chance that it occurs based on the bias.  
There is another option for chances. It could be the chance that an entity like the coin has two 
separate single-track dispositions. The coin would have the single-track disposition to flip heads 
and likewise a separate single-track disposition to flip tails. Similarly the die would have 6 
separate dispositions corresponding to its sides. The dispositions would all have to have the same 
stimulus condition yet remain distinct. If the coin had different stimulus conditions then it would 
be obvious that if the coin would have different manifestations.  This would of course be be 
counter to our whole project. We so far have been striving to figure out how something that 
could genuinely have numerous manifestations from one stimulus condition can be consistent 
with chance. Objective chances seem to presuppose the same stimulus conditions.  
This option faces two problems. The first problem is that adherents must argue that even 
though the stimulus is the same that the dispositions cannot be reduced to the disjunctive 
statement. Adherents of this view must also explain how the dispositions work with each other to 
create what we know as a chance. Since the metaphysical problems for chance distributions are 
deep. The best option is to the latter despite the question of whether it reduces or not. If we 
assume that it does not then we still have the question of how it grounds chances in a 
deterministic world. This question will serve as the focus of the rest of this chapter.  
 
c. Manifestations 
For the reason stated throughout these last two chapters I have argued that the manifestations 
of chances are not chance distributions or connected to chance distributions in any ontological 
way. Chances as dispositional properties must manifest themselves in real ways; the way that I 
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have hinted at is through the outcome of the chance trial. The manifestation of the chance to flip 
heads is the coin flipping heads; the manifestation of the die rolling six is the die rolling six, etc. 
This allows chances to be rooted in something more concrete and metaphysically strong.  
 
d. Account 
Putting the pieces together we get that chances are dispositional properties. Specifically they 
are single-track dispositions. I have argued that deterministic chances have intrinsic dispositional 
properties based in nothing more than their physical structure. The coin intrinsically has a chance 
of flipping with a .5 chance of coming up heads. This means that the coin has a disposition to flip 
heads and a disposition to flip tails. Unlike Mellor I centrally located the manifestation in the 
outcome or the objects’ Φ-ing rather than the chance distribution.   
 
II. THE SPECTER OF DETERMINISM 
 
With an account of chances as dispositions in place the task remains to show how this 
account is capable with determinism. In its most basic sense determinism is the thesis that the 
state of the world supervenes, or is determined, by the previous state of the world in conjunction 
with the laws of nature. I have explained that Eagle’s Chance Ability Principle provides us with 
a useful way in which to see how objective chances can remain in a deterministic world but I 
have also explained how this while being useful is not an account of objective chances. In the 
following section I am left with two burdens show how my account in a (a) strengthening of 
CAP and (b) show how this account is consistent with determinism.  
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a. Dispositional Account of Chance and CAP 
CAP restated is:  
   
The Chance-Ability Principle (CAP) 
Where X is a noun phrase, and Ф a complement 
verb phrase, the chance of X Ф-ing exceeds zero iff 
X can Ф. (Similarly, as ‘MUST’ is dual to ‘CAN’, 
the chance of X Ф-ing is one iff X must Ф.)97 
 
 
CAP makes the distinction between trivial chances and objective chances by taking into 
account whether the objects CAN actually do the action in question. This CAN claim is linked to 
an ability to do the action. What makes the coin have a chance of flipping heads is that it has the 
ability to flip heads or it CAN flip heads. What makes it the case that it has a chance of flipping 
tails is likewise that it CAN flip tails. On my dispositional account of chance what grounds the 
chance are the single track dispositions. This seems to at first be at odds with CAP. CAP’s 
chances are grounded in abilities while my chances are grounded in dispositions. But as we have 
seen before this distinction is misleading. Dispositions and abilities, I have argued, are 
necessarily linked together. X has the disposition to Φ iff X has the ability to Φ likewise X has 
the ability to Φ iff it has the disposition to Φ.  
The account again grows more complex and metaphysically stronger. Objects with 
chances have both dispositions and abilities to Φ. The coin that is flipped has a ½ chance of 
flipping heads because it has a multiple track disposition to flip heads and to not flip heads. 
Objects like the coin also have a corresponding ability to flip heads and not to flip heads. With 
CAP as merely a constraining principle Eagle is not able to explain why chances have these 
abilities. The dispositional account of chance that I am positing shows the connection. Chances 
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are abilities because they are dispositional properties. The ability ascription that Eagle gives to 
chances is actually paired with an account of chance that makes sense of the ability involved. 
CAP is not capable with my dispositional account of chance but is also bettered by this account.  
 
b. Determinism 
 
It can be argued that despite the connection with CAP it still does seem as though my 
dispositional account of chance provides an account of deterministic chance. The notion of a 
numerous dispositions with the same stimulus conditions seems to be inherently indeterministic. 
Determinism requires some level of unique evolution. This constraint of unique evolution seems 
to mean that one stimulus condition gives one unique result. If I were to put the object into that 
stimulus condition then I should get the same result over and over again. This is exemplified by 
the pendulum. Swung in the same exact way I should get the exact same outcome, mainly the 
same motion. The single-track dispositions at the root of chance seem to contradict this principle. 
Instead of one unique outcome the entity in question can manifest its self in multiple different 
ways from the same stimulus conditions. If I were to flip the coin in the same way the two 
single-track dispositions with the same stimulus conditions makes that the coin could manifest 
by an outcome of either flipping heads or not flipping heads. In a deterministic world I should 
see the same result from the stimulus conditions with an equation like necessity.  
A solution to this problem hinges critically on the distinction between the laws of nature 
and properties. A way to show the two are compatible is to assume that (1) laws of nature are 
metaphysically real, (2) assuming them to be deterministic in the deterministic world we are 
considering and (3) to be separate from the local properties of objects. What happens in the case 
of chances in a deterministic world is that the laws of nature, like the laws regarding the motion 
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of entities etc., work to mask the other possible manifestations. In other words, the property and 
ability to do otherwise remains in the object; it is merely masked by deterministic laws that 
control which outcome manifests. This, of course, relies on the three assumptions of the laws of 
nature that I have laid out. There are accounts of laws of nature where laws are nothing more 
than regularities that have no real power; such laws could not work to mask chance dispositions. 
The laws of nature that are required to make this account work must act on entities. The laws of 
nature must be separate from the properties that make up the entities. With this separation we can 
see how we can have a seemingly indeterministic property in a deterministic world. However if 
the laws of nature are determined by the relations of local properties in individuals then it would 
be impossible to have this relationship. Also this account requires that the laws of nature are not 
part of the stimulus conditions. In order to get around this problem I will have to rely on a 
restricted version of the stimulus conditions. The stimulus conditions with have to be relegated to 
simply the direct appropriate entities used to bring about the manifestation. In the coin example 
the stimulus conditions are the flipping of the condition with an appropriate flipping mechanism.  
This is an account of chance that is compatible with a deterministic world with 
deterministic laws. The object still has the ability to flip heads and tails as well as the single-
track dispositions regardless of the deterministic laws. The incompatiblists claim that in a 
deterministic world chances other than 1 or 0 do not exist. In one sense they are right but in 
another sense they are wrong.  When the deterministic laws are taken into account and they 
exercise their power on entities there are no chances other then 1 or 0. But this is a misguided 
view as I have argued objects have intrinsic chances based on categorical properties like their 
physical structure. These objects have chances that are not necessarily 1 or 0. In the deterministic 
world we can still look at the coin sitting on the table and make the correct statement that it has a 
74 
 
½ chance of flipping heads. As with the context sensitivity discussion the referent changes yet 
the property the chance that the coin has remains the same. The chance of the coin flipping a 
certain way in virtue of the deterministic laws is either 1 or 0 the virtue of it flipping either way 
in virtue of its make-up is .5. The former represents an extrinsic chance and the latter represents 
and intrinsic chance and they are both compatible in a deterministic system.  
 
III. RADIOACTIVE DECAY 
  
So far I have used example of coin flips and dice rolls to bolster my account of chance. I 
turn now to giving a very basic account of the dispositional theory of chance with half-lives and 
radioactive decay. Radioactive decay is the process of an unstable atom losing its ions. 
Intuitively we think that if an atom loses half of its ions in one hour it should lose the next half of 
its atoms in the next hour. This is not necessarily so rather, on the individual level atomic decay 
is unpredictable. Radioactive decay is intimately related to randomness and probability.  
Explaining radioactive decay with my dispositional theory of chance I must start out with 
the unstable atomic nucleus. The unstable nucleus has a chance of emitting X amount of particles 
in a certain timeframe. This chance can be further explained by the nucleus’s disposition to 
release X amount of ions in timeframe T and thus a corresponding ability. There are numerous 
single-track dispositions that correlate to the release of an different amount of atoms, which 
essentially leaves the numerous amounts of ions open to be considered the manifestation. 
Regardless of whether there are deterministic laws or probabilistic laws actually governing the 
decay at the higher level at the lower level the atomic nucleuses still have these intrinsic chances 
to release a certain amount of ions in a certain period of time. Multi-track and single-track 
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dispositions in general may help to explain the existence of randomness on lower individual 
levels while having determinism at higher global levels.
98
  
 
CONCLUSION 
  
By looking at the problems with Mellor’s dispositional theory of chance I have provided 
a better account of how dispositional properties ground chances. On my dispositional account 
chances are composed of complex single-track dispositions. These dispositions are intrinsic to 
objects based on their physical categorical properties.  When we consider how extrinsic factors 
influence these properties we see how determinism and objective chances are compatible. 
Deterministic laws work to mask the other possible manifestations that to do not manifest. This 
means that chances other than 1 and 0 do exist in a deterministic world but not when we consider 
the deterministic laws acting upon these objects.  
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 This is assuming that radioactivity has some short of physical base that is relevant to its behavior. If this is true 
than I think my account suffices to explain the chance. If it is not true, as it may certainly be, I think that the chance 
here is a pure indeterministic chance.  
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